[OpenID] OpenID + Government

[Nat Sakimura]

On Thu, Aug 13, 2009 at 2:40 PM, John Bradley <john.bradley at wingaa.com>wrote:

> Nat,
>
> Look at sec 8.1.2
> Eavesdropping resistance: An authentication protocol is resistant to
> eavesdropping attacks if an eavesdropper who records all the messages
> passing
> between a claimant and a verifier or relying party finds that it is
> impractical to
> learn the private key, secret key or password or to otherwise obtain
> information
> that would allow the eavesdropper to impersonate the claimant.
> Eavesdropping
> resistant protocols make it impractical3 for an attacker to carry out an
> off-line
> attack where he/she records an authentication protocol run then analyses it
> on
> his/her own system for an extended period, for example by systematically
> attempting to try every password in a large dictionary, or by brute force
> exhaustion.


But this does not per se require encryption.
OpenID assertion is not carrying private key, secret key nor password,
and if done correctly, it is quite impractical to recover those from the
assertion itself.


>
>
> Also Table 3 on page 39 Required Protections


same as above.


>
>
> Using AX update_url doesn't protect the authentication token.
> It would send a unsolicited positive assertion to the RP return_to URL with
> a separate token.


What is this?


>
>
> Also 8.2.2.2.Assertions  requires that the trusted entity(OP) authenticates
> to the RP using a secure protocol.  As the OP is connecting to the RP in the
> AX case mutual TLS would be required.


Indeed.


>
>
> In AX the store message is a indirect message sorry.  It is not relevant to
> the LoA 2 case


It probably is, but then it is due only to the paragraph in Overview section
and the requirement that extensions "piggybacks" on Authentication
Protocols.
What about if we piggybacked on association request?

Well... I think we ought to change the Auth 2.0 really.


> in any event as LoA 2 requires protection against eavesdroppers on the
> reply.
>
> Honestly it is better to take LoA 1 now and work on LoA 2 with proper
> planning and spec cycle.


Agreed. I wonder why it is standing still.
What can we do to push it forward?
It is sooooo damn hard to get the WG started here.
And from the point of view of the IPR safety, it is unwise to discuss any
technical thing prior to the formation of the WG. Maybe we should get a
Kantara WG with OIDF as designated standard body started instead (sarcasm
here). That's easy and safe.


>
>
> A lot of thought went into the decision not to hold up openID LoA 1 by
> trying to include LoA 2 in the same profile.
>
> We have only covered some of the issues.  Password entropy, identity
> proofing, liability, and other issues all come into play at LoA 2.
>
> Getting LoA 1 approved was no cake walk itself.
>
> I have probably said too much as it is.
>
> I look forward to the GSA releasing the profile then people will have
> something more concrete to criticize.  I will happily take the heat for
> that.
>
> John B.
>
>
> On 12-Aug-09, at 8:48 PM, Nat Sakimura wrote:
>
>  Yes. Go for Artifact Binding!
>> That happens to be the main road block for even writing CX.
>> If we had that, we could completely reuse the OpenID protocols already
>> spec'ed out.
>> Unfortunately it is not the case.
>>
>> Current thinking is that CX sends the AX store message to OP Endpoint in
>> direct communication, which sounds like a bit of stretch. Is that OK from AX
>> stand point???
>> Hope so. See http://www.sakimura.org/en/modules/wordpress/index.php?p=89 for
>> details in Section 4, Protocol.
>>
>> On the assertion disclosure, I do not read that requirement on NIST
>> SP800-63. It only requires "digitally signed by trusted entity" or direct
>> communication. (Here, "digitally signed" means signed by public key
>> cryptography. OpenID "sign" does not qualify).
>>
>> Which document are you referring to?
>>
>> To cope with "Digital Signature" issue, we can adopt it in OpenID 2.1.
>> Alternatively, we can profile AX so that it carries rsa-sha256 signature.
>>
>> =nat
>>
>> On Thu, Aug 13, 2009 at 5:42 AM, Breno de Medeiros <breno at google.com>
>> wrote:
>> Complexity could be minimally increased by defining an artifact profile.
>>
>> Encryption using artifact profile requires no specification, comes for
>> free by having OP SSL endpoints.
>>
>> Artifact profile would reduce the length of URLs, currently a problem
>> (not all implementations seem to handle POST very well, and POST can
>> be annoying on mobile devices or when changing from SSL to non-SSL
>> context). I think it would be more beneficial on that basis than even
>> from a security standpoint.
>>
>> Otherwise, I agree with John's assessment.
>>
>> On Wed, Aug 12, 2009 at 1:32 PM, John Bradley<john.bradley at wingaa.com>
>> wrote:
>> > Kids,
>> > The GSA is producing a profile of standards.
>> > OpenID 2.0,  PAPE and AX are the only standards.
>> > Surprisingly SREG 1.1 is not a standard (I guess we just forgot in our
>> > enthusiasm for AX)
>> > The last thing the GSA wants (as I understand it) is to create new specs
>> and
>> > impose them on the community.    This includes picking winners and
>> losers in
>> > proposed extensions.
>> > The GSA has not said that openID can never be LoA 2+ , only that given
>> the
>> > existing specs available to profile it doesn't meet the criteria of
>> SP800-63
>> > for LoA 2.
>> > The protocol MUST prevent assertion disclosure at LoA 2.
>> > That is the main roadblock.
>> > Other protocols encrypt the assertion to the RP or use a direct SSL
>> > connection (artifact binding)
>> > It is a tradeoff that openID community needs to consider carefully,
>> >  security can be increased to meet LoA 2 but it will be at the cost of
>> > increased complexity.
>> > It may not be a good bargain.  That however is a decision for the
>> community
>> > to make and not the GSA or any other government.
>> > I don't believe that CX addresses this issue,  it is intended to solve a
>> > different trust problem.
>> > Nat and I have discussed this.
>> > If there is a extension to openID or changes to the core spec that allow
>> > openID to be profiled at LoA 2+ then the GSA or whoever can revisit the
>> > profile.
>> > These things are not cast in stone.
>> > Some of the things in the TFAP are a challenge the Shibboleth community
>> as
>> > well.
>> > If a bank wants to send your unencrypted data through a browser as a
>> > redirect, good for them.
>> > The GSA and OMB  have to live within SP800-63,  and given that I think
>> the
>> > decision to profile openID for LoA 1 while the community sort out where
>> it
>> > wants to go is reasonable.
>> > My opinions are my own as always, and not representative of any
>> government
>> > or organization.
>> > Take a deep breath,  relax it is all good.
>> > John B.
>> >
>> > Message: 5
>> > Date: Wed, 12 Aug 2009 12:25:45 -0700
>> > From: Peter Williams <pwilliams at rapattoni.com>
>> > Subject: Re: [OpenID] OpenID + Government
>> > To: Paul Madsen <paulmadsen at rogers.com>
>> > Cc: "openid-general at lists.openid.net"
>> > <openid-general at lists.openid.net>
>> > Message-ID: <73608B74-40FB-419E-A4A5-94C8F0C9673B at rapattoni.com>
>> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
>> >
>> > Ok!
>> >
>> > So you did what myspace did: took the defined extension points and
>> > added value . They discarded the dh handshake, and use a vendor
>> > specific association protocol (apparently). Better strength and
>> > assurance hopefully... falling back to default (low) assurance ...
>> > when no better option can be found.
>> >
>> > In your case, I'll guess in the endpoint xrd that you advertise - per
>> > the model -additional extension handler names, so adding value via the
>> > extension framework. Presumably this offers something suiting banking
>> > frauds to only those endpoints wanting to rely on xri resolution ...
>> > for capability negotiation and address selection (which is the more
>> > openid way of doing things).
>> >
>> > This is all just like ssl, now, where folks up negotiate higher
>> > strength mechanisms and higher level operational assurances.
>> >
>> > But look at the difference In my tone and characterization, when
>> > discussing the assurance space.
>> >
>> > Let's tell the ssl story using a divisive characterization of
>> > assurances, now:
>> >
>> > Oh my god, netscapes 40bit rc4 ciphersuite with crappy pertabators in
>> > the kdf (broken by a French student) and verisign class 1 client certs
>> > means ALL of ssl3 is low assurance. Look! GSA confirms it. It's a
>> > fact! Folks must now switch to IPsec, for >loa1 assurance level when
>> > tunelling!
>> >
>> > No. Thats not how it was handled. Nsa/Dod comes along, puts in a missi
>> > ciphersuite, adjusts the handshake flow so missi-style key agreement
>> > can share the record layer with rsa handshakes, and dod office systems
>> > get all the additional strength of missi ciphers and missi assurances
>> > when talking amongst themselves (now featuring monthly changing user
>> > keying material, key comprise handling, flash authority removal,
>> > remote cac applet provisioning on gp smartcards...). They can still
>> > interwork with public sites using rsa, at low assurance, however.
>> >
>> > (I'm showing my out of dateness In federal systems. By now, missi will
>> > have been renamed 6 times...)
>> >
>> > What we want is Strong, professional security engineering, based on cc
>> > claims, STD protection profiles, evaluated cryptomodules, even formal
>> > methods proving the info flow properties of the strong type system,...
>> > And in grassroots centric openid, We want that all to be developed in
>> > and shown by common or garden programmers, not just defense
>> > contractors working for GSA-affiliated .gov sites
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> > On Aug 12, 2009, at 8:37 AM, "Paul Madsen" <paulmadsen at rogers.com>
>> > wrote:
>> >
>> > As you acknowledge ('custom extension albeit'), the application you
>> >
>> > are
>> >
>> > referring to supplemented OpenID's own security in order to meet the
>> >
>> > higher assurance requirements.
>> >
>> > With the standardization of that 'custom extension' continuing to
>> >
>> > progress in the OpenID community, perhaps the GSA will in the future
>> >
>> > reevaluate whether the combination can support higher assurance?
>> >
>> > The GSA have said (or will say soon I guess) only that OpenID 2.0, as
>> >
>> > profiled, tops out at LOA1 (for US Gov RPs). The profile doeesnt
>> >
>> > mention
>> >
>> > (I think at least, I havent read it) CX or any other extensions that
>> >
>> > might supplement assurance.
>> >
>> > paul
>> >
>> > p.s. I believe I am as suspicious of the realty industry as you are of
>> >
>> > Liberty
>> >
>> > Peter Williams wrote:
>> >
>> > So there i am in 2006 trying to let our 100k realtors use their rsa
>> >
>> > tokencodes at lots of other websites in the realty universe.
>> >
>> > Sounds simple, no?
>> >
>> > And I walk into this religion style war of words, of spin meistering,
>> >
>> > claim and counterclaim ...and a omnipresent culture of the putdown.
>> >
>> > Generally: an intense over sensitivity, in the saml camp. And it's
>> >
>> > not
>> >
>> > because realty is a hot new market for websso sales!
>> >
>> > As a lapsed security engineer, i love seeing the passion (and i also
>> >
>> > love the saml product we selected, which we use everyday at a cost of
>> >
>> > deployment now of about $2000 partner link (taking about 3 days, in
>> >
>> > most cases)). But the "edginess" I see displayed across not one but
>> >
>> > several companies is a real issue for going further with saml. I feel
>> >
>> > like I'm stepping across a precipice.
>> >
>> > And the edginess gets noticibly stronger the moment i talk about
>> >
>> > (also) using openid in our customers trust networks.
>> >
>> > Now you are a good person to challenge on the bretts topic of "GSA
>> >
>> > has
>> >
>> > declared openid as inherently unable to address more than loa1
>> >
>> > assurance requirements". A firm you associate with has been using
>> >
>> > openid (with a custom extension albeit) for banking transactions-
>> >
>> > which are not trivial transactions for which low assurance is
>> >
>> > appropriate.how can I reconcile those 2 statements?
>> >
>> > Now I feel I'm being spun to even more. Brett made, in literary
>> >
>> > analysis, a reaching for that "defining" gsa classification. And in
>> >
>> > that act of reaching underminded his case for being impartial. A good
>> >
>> > politician doesn't reach for the very classification device that
>> >
>> > devides folks. He or she enables (almost magically) a acceptable
>> >
>> > tradeoff.
>> >
>> > Is kantara going to formally disarm the samlista brigade and move
>> >
>> > forward, or have we just got a new name for the same old warhorse?
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> > Grudgingly, they acceptedn
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> > On Aug 12, 2009, at 4:10 AM, "Paul Madsen" <paulmadsen at rogers.com>
>> >
>> > wrote:
>> >
>> > Peter, a good theory. But you forget to mention that NORAD
>> >
>> > intentionally
>> >
>> > scrambled the fighters late to allow the planes to get to the
>> >
>> > towers.
>> >
>> > Peter Williams wrote:
>> >
>> > My value- such as it is- is as an outsider.
>> >
>> > I measured 4 sources:
>> >
>> > Sun Micro rsa conference presentation on their openid pilot;
>> >
>> > rationales for never being an rp
>> >
>> > Ping identity factors gating speed of adoption of openid2 -
>> >
>> > privileged acess
>> >
>> > Scott cantors view on openid2 generally, and saml as used in xrd;
>> >
>> > raw opinion, shared freely
>> >
>> > How the uk jisc pilot of openid framed the basis for it's total
>> >
>> > adoption failure in uk academia. Was it geared to fail?
>> >
>> > Given these 4 inputs, I simply conjectured a link (liberty). I
>> >
>> > tested my conjecture by being a bit outlandish. CoMpared to the
>> >
>> > norm (fox news and msnbc), I was MILD in the imputations. Lots of
>> >
>> > Ifs, buts, shoulds, mays....that mature heads would recognize as
>> >
>> > method.
>> >
>> > Don't get upset. It's just an experiment.
>> >
>> > Little, powerless, clueless, skilless, informationless peter throws
>> >
>> > tiny word stone at mighty million dollar liberty standards lobbying
>> >
>> > machine ...and gets "over the top" reaction.
>> >
>> > Why? Why such sensitivity?
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> > On Aug 11, 2009, at 5:29 PM, "John Bradley"
>> >
>> > <john.bradley at wingaa.com<mailto:john.bradley at wingaa.com>> wrote:
>> >
>> > Peter, Brett
>> >
>> > As a member of Liberty, Kantara, ICF, and OIDF.   I can say that I
>> >
>> > have never seen any indication of Liberty plotting against openID
>> >
>> > or info-card.  (I do go to most of the secret meetings)
>> >
>> > The issue with physical access is more one of not trying to boil
>> >
>> > the ocean.
>> >
>> > There is real desire by real government RPs to use open
>> >
>> > technologies and work with commercial identity providers.  There
>> >
>> > are RPs I am working with who want this yesterday.
>> >
>> > This first step is hard enough.  Many people have been working hard
>> >
>> > for many months.
>> >
>> > One of the ways we have been able to make progress is by limiting
>> >
>> > the scope.
>> >
>> > We could have done physical access, LoA 4,  p-cards and other
>> >
>> > things.
>> >
>> > The initial program by the GSA is a start not an end to the
>> >
>> > process.
>> >
>> > There will be changes to the initial profiles and additional
>> >
>> > profiles as time and requirements permit.
>> >
>> > This first step is a scary amount of work,  give us time please.
>> >
>> > John B.
>> >
>> > On 11-Aug-09, at 5:04 PM, <mailto:
>> openid-general-request at lists.openid.net
>> >
>> > openid-general-request at lists.openid.net<mailto:
>> openid-general-request at lists.openid.net
>> >
>> > wrote:
>> >
>> > Date: Tue, 11 Aug 2009 13:43:29 -0700
>> >
>> > From: Peter Williams
>> >
>> > <<mailto:pwilliams at rapattoni.com>pwilliams at rapattoni.com<mailto:
>> pwilliams at rapattoni.com
>> >
>> > Subject: Re: [OpenID] OpenID + Government
>> >
>> > To: Brett McDowell
>> >
>> > <<mailto:email at brettmcdowell.com>email at brettmcdowell.com<mailto:
>> email at brettmcdowell.com
>> >
>> > Cc: OpenID List
>> > <<mailto:general at openid.net>general at openid.net<mailto:
>> general at openid.net
>> >
>> > Message-ID: <<mailto:7911DEBA-C04B-4CC7-8A4B-967626522E9A at rapattoni.com
>> >
>> > 7911DEBA-C04B-4CC7-8A4B-967626522E9A at rapattoni.com<mailto:
>> 7911DEBA-C04B-4CC7-8A4B-967626522E9A at rapattoni.com
>> >
>> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"
>> >
>> > If the infocard stack is technically reputable, can you explain why
>> >
>> > an
>> >
>> > accredited provider would be excluded from using it (and openid)
>> >
>> > from
>> >
>> > making assertions of physical presence?
>> >
>> > _______________________________________________
>> >
>> > general mailing list
>> >
>> > general at lists.openid.net<mailto:general at lists.openid.net>
>> >
>> > http://lists.openid.net/mailman/listinfo/openid-general
>> >
>> > _______________________________________________
>> >
>> > general mailing list
>> >
>> > general at lists.openid.net
>> >
>> > http://lists.openid.net/mailman/listinfo/openid-general
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> >
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>> >
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>> >
>> >
>>
>>
>>
>> --
>> --Breno
>>
>> +1 (650) 214-1007 desk
>> +1 (408) 212-0135 (Grand Central)
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>>
>>
>> --
>> Nat Sakimura (=nat)
>> http://www.sakimura.org/en/
>>
>
>


-- 
Nat Sakimura (=nat)
http://www.sakimura.org/en/
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