[OpenID] query regarding OP migration
Nate Klingenstein
ndk at internet2.edu
Sat May 31 02:03:40 UTC 2008
Mr. Shade,
I still believe deregistration of the user is beneficial to alleviate
the other problems I mentioned resulting from stale identity
information. However, as you describe, in the event that site A is
compromised or malicious, all is indeed lost unless the user is able
to manually reconcile themselves at all their RP's. That's generally
a pretty unfortunate situation that should be avoided actively.
Yet another reason I think OP reputation and communities are really
important,
Nate.
On 30 May 2008, at 23:34, SitG Admin wrote:
> I don't think there's any way to do that, *period*. If site A wants
> to say something about the user (as identified by their URI), it
> can. If it wants to collect details about the user, it can add that
> data to the mix. If the user *cooperates* (say, by volunteering
> their personal information because the program/service/game
> "requires" that to function, or to inform them of updates, or
> whatever), it can add that data to the mix. Most importantly,
> though - if site A wants to, it can *make up* information about the
> user and report this to anyone that asks.
>
> The *real* trick is in getting anyone else to *trust* what site A
> says. As noted in Peter's message, RP's that decide "Well, the user
> *used to* trust site A - last time we checked, anyway." to override
> "The user is telling us NOW that they do NOT trust site A." aren't
> following the security protocols. We can address this trust issue
> in the specs (I thought it was already?), and laws against libel
> may be applicable in making the site stop "saying" it (at least, so
> outspokenly), but I don't think there's any way of making a site
> *remove* data/details about someone. (A lot of royally pissed-off
> trolls whose various identities were exposed and the proof posted
> on the internet, can attest to this through their inability to have
> that evidence removed.)
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