[OpenID] Discouraging "anonymous" OpenID users
SitG Admin
sysadmin at shadowsinthegarden.com
Sat Jul 26 04:50:59 UTC 2008
One of the risks posed to Consumers is, what's to stop spammers from
just automating the process of generating URI's (with any of an
ever-growing list of Providers) that can be used to authenticate as
"real" people?
Last month I wrote about distinguishing between identities:
http://openid.net/pipermail/general/2008-June/005025.html
PGP is okay, but I have a problem with it: the requirement of a User
ID, usually a 5-character "Real name" as the bare minimum. Isn't the
public key enough? Forget not using my "Real" name as the unique
identifier; I shouldn't have to use *any* name. Other people can
assign me whatever name they wish, at their own discretion, and we
don't have to worry about conflicts between namespaces. Never mind
distinguishing between two people named "Shade"; what guarantee do
people have that EITHER of us is *really* named Shade?
None. But here's the big deal: they also don't CARE.
Think about this for a moment: is your Significant Other in love with
*you*, or in love with your name? Everything about you, that is
meaningful to other people - is the *name* really part of this?
Do we really *need* names to know what we like/value in other people,
or just to keep them separate in our heads? And if that latter is all
that's needed, all that's left for what we find meaningful *in*
identity is information *about* someone.
The same sort of information (usually content of some kind) that's
exchanged in all kinds of social interaction. As this (valued)
content accumulates under a single identity, we value that source
even *more* - because, even if we don't know who it is, we can still
appreciate their contributions.
Even if they suddenly "vanish" (never to be heard from, or seen,
again), we still have those contributions. We've *received* some
value - if they turn out to be spammers, just setting up the
appearances to *seem* like a real person, we *still have that value*.
Think of it as a security deposit against spam - but one where the
entity making this deposit receives cumulative interest on their
deposit, which may eventually exceed the amount that they originally
paid to earn initial "trust". Because that's what this is about:
trusting people, to be *real* people, by asking them to volunteer
some original "value" which they can only retain claim to if they
maintain a consistent identity. They can start over, but it would
require another deposit.
And the best part of all? The infrastructure for this wouldn't
require any marketing for adoption, because people are *already*
rating one another's contributions. We've become *used to* this
model. In one sense, the infrastructure for this is already here; it
may need some technical details, but we're already performing
value-judgements on what we read, and what it means to us.
This is all the introduction anyone should need.
-Shade
Postscript: And yet I can't help but wonder what will happen when I
begin publishing under the "Claimware" license that I worked out,
several years ago, as an idle foray into driving the RIAA *nuts*:
anyone may claim to have authored the content, but only if they
refuse to name any sources they might have acquired it through
previously, practice a non-assertion covenant of their "rights"
against others claiming the same content under the Claimware license,
and include the Claimware license with their copy.
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