[OpenID] Laws of id, openid with ssl

Martin Atkins mart at degeneration.co.uk
Sat Jan 26 12:15:23 UTC 2008


Hi Drummond,

On reflection, I think this debate is nothing more than a disagreement 
about what is meant by "private".

I tend to think of "private" as in "private key": a value that must only 
be known by the user, or by the user's agent. In this sense, the 
OP-issued identifier is not private, because it is disclosed to the RP. 
(who, in a public key crypto situation, would only see your public key).

However, I suspect that really you're thinking of "private" as in 
"enables privacy", or in the sense that the *owner* of the identifier is 
a secret. The actual string of characters that makes up the identifier 
is not a secret, but the entity to which it refers is intended to be.

A subtle difference, but one I think might end up being a point of 
confusion for other people too. "Ofuscated" is, in retrospect, probably 
too "geeky" a word to use in public for this, but perhaps "anonymous" 
would work? The goal is to avoid people knowing who you are, so 
anonymous seems like a reasonable term for it.


Drummond Reed wrote:
> George, I was only pointing out that only three parties need to know about a
> directed identifier -- the RP, the OP, and the user -- and of these, only
> the OP and the user know it is associated with the user. In practice, it's
> actually just the OP who knows this - it will store the directed identifier
> for the user, so all the user has to remember is their own OpenID identifier
> (or let a cookie do that for them) and their password.
> 
> So even though the RP resolves the directed identifier on the public
> Internet, all it reveals is that it points to the OP. Only the OP and the
> user knows who it points too inside the OP -- unlike an omnidirectional
> OpenID identifier (like a blog URL), where anyone can discovery who it
> points to.
> 
> That's why it very much is private -- were either the OP or the user to
> publish it in a way that associated it with the user, the RP would be able
> to discover the public identity of the user.
> 
> =Drummond 
> 
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: George Fletcher [mailto:gffletch at aol.com]
>> Sent: Friday, January 25, 2008 8:37 AM
>> To: 'OpenID List'
>> Cc: Drummond Reed; 'Martin Atkins'
>> Subject: Re: [OpenID] Laws of id, openid with ssl
>>
>> Hmm... I agree that the OpenID is "not intended to be public" but the
>> fact of the matter is that the RP has to resolve the "directed identity"
>> OpenID to verify that the OP is authoritative for that OpenID. In that
>> sense (unless all this is behind some firewall) the OpenID is "public".
>>
>> Initially I was thinking that the "pseudonymous" term from SAML would be
>> applicable but maybe Martin's "obfuscated" term is more applicable? (I
>> think I could go with either).
>>
>> However, should "directed identity" OpenIDs NOT be "browser" resolvable?
>> Any best practices on what the OP should do in this case? Is there data
>> exposure if the OP says that it's not authoritative for
>> https://op.example.com/abcde but is authoritative for
>> https:/op.example.com/bcdef?
>>
>> Given that hopefully all this traffic is over SSL, the ability to find
>> these identifiers and correlate them to some public usage should be
>> difficult.
>>
>> Thanks,
>> George
>>
>> Drummond Reed wrote:
>>>> -----Original Message-----
>>>> From: general-bounces at openid.net [mailto:general-bounces at openid.net] On
>>>> Behalf Of Martin Atkins
>>>> Sent: Thursday, January 24, 2008 4:27 PM
>>>> Cc: 'OpenID List'
>>>> Subject: Re: [OpenID] Laws of id, openid with ssl
>>>>
>>>> Drummond Reed wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> Peter, just to reinforce Dick's first step below -- in directed
>>>>>
>>>> identity,
>>>>
>>>>> the user does not give their own public identifier to the RP, only the
>>>>> identifier of their OP. That way the RP knows how to discover the OP's
>>>>>
>>>> XRDS
>>>>
>>>>> and connect to the service endpoint for the OP's directed identity
>>>>>
>>>> service
>>>>
>>>>> (<Type>http://specs.openid.net/auth/2.0/identifier_select</Type>).
>>>>>
>>>>> The OP then returns the user's selected identifier (either public or
>>>>>
>>>> private
>>>>
>>>>> -- user's choice).
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>> I think calling it a "private" identifier is a bit misleading. All
>>>> OpenID identifiers are public.
>>>>
>>>> Perhaps a terms to use would be "obfuscated", "single-use" or
>> "throwaway".
>>> Disagree. A pairwise-unique identifier generated by an OP is not
>> intended to
>>> be public. If it was shared publicly, i.e., could be associated with the
>>> public identifier of the user, it would lose its capability to privately
>>> identify the user's relationship with the RP.
>>>
>>> An OP-generated pairwise-unique identifier is the OpenID equivalent of
>> the
>>> PPID ("Private Personal Identifier") in Cardspace.
>>>
>>> =Drummond
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> general mailing list
>>> general at openid.net
>>> http://openid.net/mailman/listinfo/general
>>>
>>>
> 
> 




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