[OpenID] Reconsidering http://openid different from https://openid

Johannes Ernst jernst+openid.net at netmesh.us
Fri Sep 21 02:03:57 UTC 2007


> I believe the question should be framed around what solution can be
> (primarily) secure and (secondarily) intuitive. I believe any  
> attempt to
> equate HTTP and HTTPS OpenID URLs will result in a significant, and
> unacceptable, loss of security.

This is where my priorities are different. (I hear the screams  
already as I write this)

A consumer-facing technology like OpenID that is secure but not  
intuitive will be neither, because it will not be adopted: 0 times  
whatever makes 0, whether it is secure or whatever. People will use  
alternative, more intuitive technologies, who are very likely even  
less secure.

A consumer-facing technology like OpenID that is intuitive but not  
secure can still reach 100% market share in a very large market: SMTP  
and e-mail comes to mind first, and countless others.

But what I'd like to challenge us all is to find a solution to this  
problem that is intuitive and moderately secure, and can be used in a  
manner that may be less intuitive but more secure after some  
additional user education or additional conventions or what have you  
that are less general.

So ... I believe what I proposed earlier might fit the bill, perhaps  
with some more fiddling. I would go for a "recommended" instead of a  
"must" if that's what it takes to make some progress on this.







Johannes Ernst
NetMesh Inc.


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