[OpenID] Can one use Generic OpenIds
Johnny Bufu
johnny at sxip.com
Thu May 24 21:22:22 UTC 2007
On 24-May-07, at 1:32 PM, Peter Watkins wrote:
> On Thu, May 24, 2007 at 09:50:01AM -0700, Johnny Bufu wrote:
>>
>> That is a SHOULD and not a MUST because the RP has, in many points of
>> the protocol flow, the choice of stopping a transaction for
>> security / policy / etc. reasons. This is one such instance.
>>
>> Doing so does not break conformance (or reliability) with the OpenID
>> protocol, it only results in 'denial of service' based on RP policy.
>> If however the transaction completes successfully, it does so in a
>> consistent way.
>
> By "not reliable" I mean that OpenID 2.0 is not a reliable option for
> us, given that our main use case would rely on "directed identity" and
> the special identifier_select URL. If the spec allows RPs to reject
> directed identifiers, then OpenID simply isn't usable/reliable for us.
>
> Can you give some examples of reasons an RP might accept "normal"
> OpenID usage but not identifier_select and directed identity?
Nothing in the spec says that an RP MUST accept any and all "normal"
identifiers; the same policies can be applied by RPs to those as well.
> Nothing in the spec says that an RP, having successfully verified an
> OpenID identity, *must* give the holder of that identity *any* access
> to the RP's offerings.
Performing OpenID verification is one such resource, for which RPs
are entitled to have policies.
> I don't see how requiring an RP to recognize
> a directed identity as a legitimate OpenID identifier interferes with
> the RP's ability to enforce whetever policies they choose. But I do
> see how this SHOULD language gives implementers the option of writing
> less code in a way that supports the "normal" OpenID model and
> complies
> with the draft 11 spec but kills our main use case.
It would actually be more code to actively recognize a directed
identifier in a response and reject it at that point based on this
criterion. The SHOULD is there because these policies could be
implemented at a different level (blacklists in firerwalls for example).
I understand you have an issue with a SHOULD being present for the
directed identity case, but not explicitly stated for the "normal"
case. Since it can't be a MUST, I see two possible options:
a) remove it: it won't be clear that OPs can actually send different
identifiers in the response;
b) add another SHOULD for the "normal" case: I don't see it helping
the spec in general, or your issue.
Do you have a suggestion / proposal on how to fix this so that it
addresses your concern?
Johnny
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