[OpenID] OpenId Association Timeout Recommendations

[Recordon, David]

I don't think it is a reasonable assumption to make that people are
going to be running SSL with a NULL cipher suite in these situations.  I
think the spec is quite clear in the fact that you need to do TLS/SSL
right in order for it to matter.

So yes, there are MITM attacks if you're on an untrusted network and not
correctly using TLS/SSL.

--David

-----Original Message-----
From: general-bounces at openid.net [mailto:general-bounces at openid.net] On
Behalf Of Granqvist, Hans
Sent: Thursday, February 08, 2007 10:29 AM
To: David Fuelling
Cc: security at openid.net; general at openid.net
Subject: Re: [OpenID] OpenId Association Timeout Recommendations

> However, the spec seems to indicate that if SSL/TLS is used, then 
> Direct Verification is ok (Section 15.1.2, first line of 2nd 
> paragraph).  Do you agree?

In principle, yes, I do.  But SSL is such an ephemeral notion.
For instance, you can run SSL with NULL cipher suites so that traffic
goes in the clear.

To me, it seems that a RP that knows how to properly set up and use SSL
to verify the OP (with PKI trust processing) would probably want to
equally properly OpenID-associate.

The original intent of DV was for usage scenarios ("ajax") where proper
SSL is not normally nor easily available nor implementable. 

-Hans


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