[OpenID] User-centric criteria & how well current proposals stack up
frumioj at mac.com
frumioj at mac.com
Mon Apr 9 15:23:49 UTC 2007
Hi Dick,
Dick Hardt wrote:
> Hi John
>
> Rather then muddy the waters more on what user-centric is, I prefer to
> view Credentica and IBM's work as privacy enhancing that requires a
> user-centric flow.
I'm very much in agreement that we shouldn't further muddy the waters ;)
>
> There is a difference between user empowerment and user-centric.
My point though was that you shouldn't disregard Stefan's list below
simply because he sells privacy-enhancing technology which goes a bit
(but not much, I hope!) beyond what most users expect of
privacy-preserving features in technology.
Rather, I think it would suit the OpenID community quite well to
consider the aspects noted in Stefan's email, regardless of what you
call that.
>
> btw: I assume you meant blind the IdP from the RP below.
What I said was:
...
>>> Credentica's, or IBMs Camenisch credentials) that can blind the identity
>>> of the RP from the IdP,
...
By which I meant that the identity of the RP would not be revealed to
the IdP when such credentials are employed. Thanks for alerting me to my
imprecise language usage.
Regards,
- John
>
> -- Dick
>
> On 9-Apr-07, at 6:50 AM, frumioj at mac.com wrote:
>
>> Hi Dick,
>>
>> Dick Hardt wrote:
>>> Note that Stefan has a very different definition of user centric then
>>> most of the rest of us ... the model is very skewed towards the
>>> privacy enhancing tech that he is flogging ... :-)
>>
>> Although one might quibble with the order of "least user-centric -> most
>> user-centric" tech that Stefan gives, I think his list of aspects is a
>> very reasonable piece of work, irrespective of his work on
>> privacy-enhancing credentials.
>>
>> Furthermore, I would note that privacy-enhancing credentials (such as
>> Credentica's, or IBMs Camenisch credentials) that can blind the identity
>> of the RP from the IdP, and allow the user to avoid passing passwords
>> cleartext across a network /are/ very user-centric, in that they help
>> avoid phishing of user credentials, and the tracking of user behaviour
>> by a "panopticon" IdP.
>>
>> I hope that the "definition of user-centric" of those in the OpenID
>> community to which you refer is close to what Stefan is suggesting
>> below. You could do a lot worse.
>>
>> Disclosure: I don't work for or with Stefan.
>>
>> Regards,
>>
>> - John
>>>
>>> On 4-Apr-07, at 12:25 AM, Chris Drake wrote:
>>>
>>>> Hi,
>>>>
>>>> For those who've not seen the idworkshop list, here's a post neatly
>>>> explaining "user centric", unfortunately painting OpenID as one of the
>>>> "least user centric" protocols currently available.
>>>>
>>>> Kind Regards,
>>>> Chris Drake
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Thursday, February 8, 2007, 12:40:46 AM, Stefan Brands wrote:
>>>>
>>>> SB> Many of the criteria used by the broad sub-field of modern
>>>> crypto that has
>>>> SB> been researching "user empowerment" architectures for I&AM are
>>>> listed at
>>>> SB> http://www.idcorner.org/?p=142 (see below). According to these
>>>> criteria, the
>>>> SB> current ID schemes stack up as follows:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> SB> LEAST USER-CENTRIC National id card
>>>> SB> ^ tied to central DB
>>>> SB> |
>>>> SB> | MS Passport (V1)
>>>> SB> .
>>>> SB> . OpenID
>>>> SB> . .
>>>> SB> . .
>>>> SB> . .
>>>> SB> . Liberty ID-WSF
>>>> SB> .
>>>> SB> . CardSpace
>>>> SB> .
>>>> SB> . Higgins + IBM Idemix
>>>> SB> . .
>>>> SB> . .
>>>> SB> . .
>>>> SB> | CardSpace/ID-WSF/Higgins
>>>> SB> combined with strong PET(s)
>>>> SB> MOST USER-CENTRIC
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> SB> Partial list of user-centric aspects in I&AM:
>>>> SB> =============================================
>>>>
>>>> SB> - Can the data subject consent to or withhold the release of
>>>> SB> identity data? (on a case-by-case basis, informed, non-coerced, .)
>>>>
>>>> SB> -Can the data subject see the actual identity data that is
>>>> flowing?
>>>> SB> (Or is it encrypted for the SP?)
>>>>
>>>> SB> -Can the data subject hide the identity of the RP from the IdP?
>>>>
>>>> SB> -Can the data subject hide the RP's request from the IdP?
>>>>
>>>> SB> -Can the data subject locally store and manage long-lived identity
>>>> SB> credentials? (If not, then all the data subject's actions - and
>>>> therefore
>>>> SB> accounts - can be traced and linked via trivial timing analysis.)
>>>>
>>>> SB> -Can the data subject selectively disclose attribute data on
>>>> identity
>>>> SB> credentials? (If not, the data subject cannot reveal the
>>>> minimum information
>>>> SB> required for long-lived identity credentials.)
>>>>
>>>> SB> -Can the data subject avoid correlation handles across IdPs and
>>>> SPs? (If
>>>> SB> not, then data subjects are unknowingly linking up -
>>>> "federating" - all of
>>>> SB> their account relations with each and every disclosure.)
>>>>
>>>> SB> - With regard to the last two, consider also the degree to
>>>> which a user must
>>>> SB> trust third parties; in the extreme, there is no need to trust
>>>> any third
>>>> SB> party. In practice, one will always have to trust at the very
>>>> least the
>>>> SB> proper functioning of one's own software.
>>>>
>>>> SB> NOTE: This list can be expanded with a number of aspects
>>>> related to
>>>> SB> - UI-related control functions
>>>> SB> - Security for users
>>>>
>>>>
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>>>>
>>>>
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