OpenID homesite authorization spoofed

[Eddy Nigg (StartCom Ltd.)]

Chris Drake wrote:
> Hi Eddy,
Hi Chris,
> In other words: attacker can just as easily self-sign a bogus SSL
> certificate as they can self-sign their bogus DNSSEC server replies.
>   
However if we rely on CA's, than we can verify the singer of the
certificate of the IDP and RP sites....This shouldn't be too hard to
implement, I think....and would give a reasonable protection at least...

-- 
Regards
 
Signer:      Eddy Nigg, StartCom Ltd.
Phone:       +1.213.341.0390
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