[Openid-aiim] Meeting notes
Atul Tulshibagwale
atul at sgnl.ai
Fri Sep 26 01:30:49 UTC 2025
Hi all,
The notes from today's AIIM CG call are saved here:
https://github.com/openid/cg-ai-identity-management/wiki/20250925
Thanks very much to Chris Phillips
<https://www.linkedin.com/in/chris-phillips-cidpro/>, Tobin South
<https://www.linkedin.com/in/tobinsouth/> and Nick Steele
<https://www.linkedin.com/in/nickelsteele/> for their presentations today.
Presenters, please share the decks for your presentations to this mailing
list.
I'm copying them below for convenience.
Atul
--
Atul Tulshibagwale
CTO
<https://www.linkedin.com/in/tulshi/> <atul at sgnl.ai>
---
Sep 25, 2025Attendees
Name
Affiliation
Participation Agreement signed?
Tobin South
WorkOS & Stanford
Yes
Atul Tulshibagwale
SGNL
Yes
Rick Burta
Okta
Yes
Subramanya N
Independent
yes
Eleanor Meritt
Independent
yes
Dan Moore
FusionAuth
Yes
Tal Skverer
Astrix Security
Yes
Vaibhav Narula
Independent
Yes
Asanka Samaraweera
Independent
Yes
Ricky Padilla
1Password
Yes
Nick Steele
1Password
Yes
Paul Templeman
Independent
Yes
Paul Lanzi
IDenovate
Yes
Sarah Cecchetti
Beyond Identity
yes
Bertrand Carlier
Wavestone
Almost there…
Andrew Moran
Independent
Yes. First time!
Stan Bounev
Blue Label Labs
Yes
Lukasz Jaromin
Raidiam
Yes
Adwait Shinganwade
Independent
Yes
Victor Lu
independent
yes
Tom jones
ind
yes
Aldo Pietropaolo
Sophos Advisor
Yes
Max Crone
1Password
Yes
Anuradha Karunarathna
WSO2
Yes
Agenda
-
Tobin’s weekly updates (5 minutes)
-
Chris Phillips on OpenID Federation and MCP (20 minutes)
-
Tobin: MCP Dev Summit preview: Agent Auth (20 minutes)
-
Nick Steele <nick.steele at 1password.com>: Agent Payment Protocol Intro
(10 mins) - Slides
<https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1PU0pl2TI-MzZfMthlMcRXGPEA7EYQJK15nwuS7bIa-Q/edit?usp=sharing>
NotesChris Phillips’ Presentation
-
Chris Phillips’ presentation: Improving AI Identity, Trust and
Provenance using OpenID Federation
-
Background in federated identity in the research and education sector
-
Challenges:
-
Shadow MCP
-
“Rug pull problem”
-
(many others in the slides)
-
Multi-lateral federation is an opportunity for the AI space.
-
Take things that are happening in past protocols and bring them to AI
-
“Federation guides who you can trust. OAuth / OIDC still decides what
you can do.”
-
OpenID Federation is great at trust, but you still need a registry of
“what you can trust”
-
OpenID Federation is a trust fabric:
-
A Trust Anchor (e.g. CA) signs an “Entity Statement”
-
Each participant OP/ RP/ RS exposes an Entity Configuration
-
Just like a browser flags untrusted certifications, a missing or
untrusted attestation can flag untrustworthy participants in MCP
-
It’s ready for primetime:
-
Italy’s Public Digital Identity System (SPID)
-
OpenID Federation pilot takes it to 10k entities to enable SAML2
federation
-
Candidate use cases:
-
Defense against rogue MCP
-
SBOM for MCP servers
-
Shard usage based on user’s role (authorization)
-
Safe personal use of MCP
-
Readiness for PQC
-
Demo of gateway MCP
-
Critical to secure AI
-
“Meta MCP”
-
Questions / comments:
-
(Lukasz Jaromin) Connections in MCP do not require prior
registration, so having trust marks would be good
-
(Chris) Just like you can connect anonymously to a website, and then
be challenged for authentication, you should be able to do something
similar in MCP
-
(Atul) How does this tie into threat modeling?
-
(Chris) This is going to be important.
-
The process of issuing a trust mark will be tied to threat modeling
-
I’ve done a Safe MCP analysis
-
(Paul Templeman) How do you see dynamic / unstructured ecosystems
play into this
-
(Chris) Think of an MCP Server that has “get customer information”
as a tool. Who is the user that is asking the question?
-
MCPs can be in multiple “venn diagrams” (trust domains?) Which one
takes priority?
-
(Tom Jones) i have posted an AI threat model - OIDC does not fit that
- does anyone have a threat model for using this trust structure with AI?
https://github.com/w3c-cg/threat-modeling/blob/main/models/ai-in-browser.md
Tobin’s Presentation
-
We are publishing the “future of agent identity” white paper in the OIDF
soon.
-
There’s an MCP Dev Summit next week.
-
Tools can be highly dynamic - based on user roles and permissions
-
Creates a bunch of security risks
-
Cross-app authorization is an interesting proposal from Aaron
-
Background agents are cool - you just get a PR from the agent.
-
Hard to define the full scope of permissions in order for the agent to
be effective
-
Attenuation of permissions is also interesting (especially in transitive
use cases)
-
What does MCP look like in a world of fully autonomous agents?
-
What are we missing as far as authorization in AI? Love to get opinions
on this:
Questions:
-
(Tom Jones) If you are talking about an AI, you need rich policy. We
don’t have anyone working on that as far as I know.
-
(Nick) ID-JAG (cross-app access) was meant to deal with the multiple
trust boundary issue. If I have a central auth server, it solves some
issues.
-
(Tobin) Going to talk about agentic payments stuff
-
ID-JAGs work as long as you are using the same IdP. If you are
delegating to another organizations’ agent, then it might not work
-
(Nick) We had multiple IdPs / gateways in Cisco, but being able to
have a central authority across trust boundaries is better
-
(Chris) It takes multiple ingredients to make a good cake. You’re going
to have different contexts for different regions.
-
It’s such a high step function today to do everything, that it needs to
be brain dead easy to do some of the basic stuff first.
-
(Atul) What’s the distinction between background agents and async agents
-
(Tobin) You expect background agents to be able to prompt
-
(Lukasz) Everything on your last slide makes sense. Couple of options on
that list make the multi-domain thing work. But there is a question of
adoption and how to make it tangible.
Nick’s Presentation on AP2
-
AP2 works on top of MCP and A2A, and facilitates payment transactions
-
“Intent mandates” with an attestable chain of events
-
“Cart mandate” that reflects the intent.
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