Does OAuth security vulnerability affect OpenID/OAuth hybrid?

Allen Tom atom at yahoo-inc.com
Thu May 14 01:15:55 UTC 2009


I like the idea of issuing a short lived Access Token that has to be 
periodically refreshed using checkid_immdiate , implying  that the user 
needs to be signed-in to  both the OP (and presumably the RP) in order 
to refresh the credentials. This makes a lot of sense from a security 
perspective, and helps to mitigate the scenario where an RP that the 
user doesn't actively use has persistent access to user's data.

However, I believe that the conventional use case for OAuth is to issue 
persistent credentials to the RP to allow the RP to access services on 
behalf of the user, independent of the user having an active browser 
session at either the OP or RP.

Allen


Luke Shepard wrote:
> As I suggested, an OP may want to give an updated session via checkid-immediate. Facebook Connect does this, and it seems like a legit use case to me.
>
> ________________________________
> From: Andrew Arnott <andrewarnott at gmail.com>
> To: Allen Tom <atom at yahoo-inc.com>
> Cc: Luke Shepard; OpenID Specs Mailing List <specs at openid.net>
> Sent: Wed May 13 17:05:00 2009
> Subject: Re: Does OAuth security vulnerability affect OpenID/OAuth hybrid?
>
> I would expect a decent OP to consider that it goes without saying that checkid_immediate wouldn't have a reasonable OAuth token authorizing scenario and block it.  So I agree it's good to call it out in the spec.
> --
> Andrew Arnott
> "I [may] not agree with what you have to say, but I'll defend to the death your right to say it." - S. G. Tallentyre
>
>
> On Tue, May 12, 2009 at 10:06 PM, Allen Tom <atom at yahoo-inc.com<mailto:atom at yahoo-inc.com>> wrote:
> Hi Luke,
>
> I don't think there's a session fixation issue with Hybrid, but I believe that several individuals raised concerns regarding auto-approval of OAuth tokens using regular OAuth, which is essentially the same thing as checkid_immediate mode in Hybrid.
>
> Is there really a reason why an RP would need the OAuth token returned in a checkid_immediate response if the user had previously authorized one on an earlier visit?
>
> Allen
>
>
> Luke Shepard wrote:
> (hijacking thread a bit)
>
> Allen-
>
> If I understand it correctly, the OAuth security issue doesn’t affect the hybrid spec in the same way.
>
> With the OAuth session fixation vulnerability, the problem comes if the attacker does the following:
>
>
>  1.  Request a request token by pretending to request access
>  2.  Force the user to go to a url using that request token
>  3.  Muah! Calculate what the return_to url would have been, and use the pre-known request token to gain access to the user’s account info.
>
> In the OAuth hybrid flow, there is no pre-registered request token; instead, the token is returned, securely, in the URL. It is protected by the fact that OpenID requires the realm to match the return_to, and many providers can require that the Oauth request realm also match the OpenID realm. In this flow, there’s no way for the attacker to intercept the request_token before it makes its way back to the correct user.
>
> Perhaps the problem is more subtle than I understood, but I just want  to make sure I’m clear on the issues.
>
> On 5/12/09 9:48 PM, "Allen Tom" <atom at yahoo-inc.com<http://atom@yahoo-inc.com>> wrote:
>
> Hi Nat,
>
> Here you go:
>
> http://step2.googlecode.com/svn/spec/openid_oauth_extension/latest/openid_oauth_extension.html
>
> We might need to revise the spec to not support checkid_immediate for
> the Hybrid flow, becuase auto-issuing OAuth access tokens is probably a
> bad thing, in light of the recent OAuth security issue.
>
> Allen
>
>
>
>
>
> Nat Sakimura wrote:
>   
>> Hi.
>>
>> Where can I find the most current version of OpenID / OAuth hybrid spec draft?
>> I would like to look at it to see if I can borrow as much from the
>> draft for what I am thinking right now.
>>
>>
>>     
>
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