backchannel/endpoint URLs, desired attributes

Peter Watkins peterw at tux.org
Tue Dec 15 17:54:17 UTC 2009


On Tue, Dec 15, 2009 at 06:35:18PM +0100, Chris Obdam wrote:

> In Holland we are going to work with the Attribute Exchange Validation Extension draft from tomorrow. The largest OP in Holland, Hyves (8 milion users) is going to support. We hope to find out what flaws there are in the current draft.

That is excellent news.

> We really need the meta data, verified_date. We are also trying to create a public list of validation method for each attribute.
> Have you looked into http://step2.googlecode.com/svn/spec/attribute_exchange_validate/trunk/openid-attribute-exchange-validate-mode.html?

Yes, I have, and have commented on that draft:
http://lists.openid.net/pipermail/openid-specs/2009-December/006189.html

Since there seems to be consensus regarding the importance of validation date,
I'll just paste my comments on the other concern I have with that draft:

2) The openid.ax.validation parameter purports to be about quality, but
   the examples don't show the sort of options that Joseph A Holsten
   suggested (Supplied by user vs. OP thinks this is the user's email vs.
   the OP indemnifies the RP for any legal claims arising from the 
   assertion being false). The examples show RPs specifying specific
   means of verification (token_via_email, pin_via_sms) which sounds
   both contentious (deciding which of two methods is stronger) and
   difficult to manage (who maintains the enumerated lists of methods?
   what happens if later research reveals a fundamental flaw in some
   method, or infrastructure changes alter the value of some methods?).
   I think it would be better to define the validation level as a 
   number, and provide some guidance on what sort of current (i.e.
   as of the date the spec is approved) validation methods should 
   equate to certain levels. There's always going to be a problem of
   trust here, as anybody could set up an OP that claims with 100%
   certaintly that my name is David Recordon. There will be a natural
   tendency for RPs to whitelist trustworthy OPs, just as we've seen
   whitelists of the PKI vendors we all depend on for our TLS/SSL certs.
   So don't get bogged down in an exhaustive enumeration of methods
   (I can just imagine providers of patended systems clamoring to
   be listed) and an exhausting excercise of comparing methods (whose
   PIN mailer is better? Is the US postal service more or less 
   secure and trustworthy than the Swiss postal service?). Use general
   examples and numeric scores.

-Peter



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