Proposal: An anti-phishing compromise

john kemp john.kemp at mac.com
Fri Feb 2 14:30:31 UTC 2007


Hi Josh,

In addition to the protocol parameter that you have proposed, I'd hope
that we can add something like what you wrote below as part of the
security considerations section of the OpenID 2.0 Auth specification, as
this text seems to capture quite succinctly the issues that RPs and OPs
should be thinking about when attempting to deal with phishing:

Josh Hoyt wrote:

> The ways that OpenID can potentially make phishing worse:
> 
>  * Redirects to your provider are a fundamental part of the flow of
> OpenID, so being redirected to a phishing site is easy to miss
> 
>  * Every relying party (necessarily) needs to know who the provider
> is in order to verify the authentication response. This means that the
> site knows what UI it needs to use to phish (and even worse, it can
> just proxy the user to the provider)
> 
> I think these two issues cover what makes phishing potentially a
> greater threat when using OpenID.
> 
> Although these problems are significant, if a user can authenticate to
> their OpenID provider through an "non-phishable" mechanism, OpenID can
> make the phishing problem *less* of a threat, because there are fewer
> places that will need to ask for credentials.
> 
> Other relevant issues:
> 
>   * There is no universally deployed solution to the phishing problem
> 
>   * There is not even a universally *accepted* solution to the phishing problem
> 
>   * Any technology that prevents phishing will require user-agent
> support or else will fundamentally change the flow of OpenID (prevent
> relying-party-initiated sign-in)
> 
>   * OpenID is intended to be deployed without requiring specific
> technologies to be present in the user-agent

It might also be helpful to add somewhere a specific definition of
phishing, and the associated attack - that an OP can steal a user's
credentials if they are passed to the OP. Mitigation can only really be
performed by applying client-side changes that ensure that long-lived
private information shared only between the OP and the user (such as a
password) does not pass across the network.

Regards,

- John



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