[Openid-specs-mobile-profile] Client credential lifecycle mgmt for Native Apps

philippe.clement at orange.com philippe.clement at orange.com
Tue Apr 14 16:36:50 UTC 2015

Dear all,

I’m pretty in line with option 2.
However, I must admit that having to manage hundreds of thousands of application credentials (multiplied by the number of partners) could be a disadvantage for some OP, and not for other OP.
Do we have really to choose between the 2 options? or said in another way, can we imagine that some OP could provide option 1, and others option 2 ? More than this, we can imagine that some OP would provide the 2 options, according the business and partner context. In any case, option 2 reinforces security and I like it.

My 2 cts
Kind regards,

De : Openid-specs-mobile-profile [mailto:openid-specs-mobile-profile-bounces at lists.openid.net] De la part de Torsten Lodderstedt
Envoyé : lundi 13 avril 2015 11:30
À : GONZALO FERNANDEZ RODRIGUEZ; Lodderstedt, Torsten; openid-specs-mobile-profile at lists.openid.net
Objet : Re: [Openid-specs-mobile-profile] Client credential lifecycle mgmt for Native Apps

Hi Gonzalo,

interesting comment. So far I assumed the service provider would need to sign Terms of Service for every MNO and the MNOs the SP had signed up for would be carried in the software statement.

Mapping this to your use case would mean to issue and roll out a new software statement - so no benefit with respect to this use case.

Best regards,
Am 13. April 2015 11:03:03 MESZ, schrieb GONZALO FERNANDEZ RODRIGUEZ <gonzalo.fernandezrodriguez at telefonica.com<mailto:gonzalo.fernandezrodriguez at telefonica.com>>:
Hi guys,

I don't have a clear preference on which is the best option, however I see another "pro" in the second one, I think it offers a smooth integration in case of a new operator is on boarded in Mobile Connect because is transparent for the Service Providers. If a user that belongs to the new operator is going to be authenticated, once the operator is discovered, the Service Provider would only have to send a registration request without needing to be aware if the operator is new or not in Mobile Connect. I don't know how could manage this scenario using the first approach.


De: <Lodderstedt>, Torsten <t.lodderstedt at telekom.de<mailto:t.lodderstedt at telekom.de>>
Fecha: viernes 10 de abril de 2015 18:39
Para: "openid-specs-mobile-profile at lists.openid.net<mailto:openid-specs-mobile-profile at lists.openid.net>" <openid-specs-mobile-profile at lists.openid.net<mailto:openid-specs-mobile-profile at lists.openid.net>>
Asunto: [Openid-specs-mobile-profile] Client credential lifecycle mgmt for Native Apps

Hi all,

during the working session at IIW it became apparent that we don’t have a consent on the way client credentials are managed for native apps in the context of the mobile profile. As this an important design consideration, which will drive not only the registration spec but also considerations with respect to signature algorithms and so on, I would like to come to a consensus on that topic soon.

There are basically two options:

1)      All instances of a native app (== the software package) share the same identity. This typically means, the app is registered as a so-called public client with the AS/OP and only gets issued a client_id. In the context of the mobile profile, I would assume the developer registers with a developer portal and gets issued distinct client_ids per MNO (a pair of issuer and client_id). At runtime, the app can decide based on the outcome of the discovery process which client_id to use for the respective MNO.

2)      Every instance of a native app on a device is registered with the MNO. This would typically happen when the user uses the login with a certain MNO on this device for the first time. So the app first would discover the MNO and determine whether it already is in possession of client credentials for this particular MNO (based on its Issuer). If not, it would send a registration request to the MNO.

I see the following pros and cons:

Option (1) is established practice (except the fact an app managing several client ids for different OPs). So developers know how to work that way. Software statements could be used to automate the way client ids are obtain in the deployment process. But there are other ways as well.

Option (2) is a new approach. It has the advantage to provide every instance with a distinct credential, which allows to recognize and authenticate this instance later on. It could be used to prevent authz code theft on the device, something we already have SPOP for (http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-spop-10 - sorry John, forgot the new acronym). Do you see other advantages? On the other hand, this option would require the OP to implement credential management for potentially a lot of client instances. This will be a challenge with respect to state management on the OP’s side.

Please comment on this topic.

Thanks in Advance,

Products & Innovation
Dr.-Ing. Torsten Lodderstedt
Head of Development
Customer Platforms
T-Online Allee 1, 64295 Darmstadt
+49 6151 680 7038 (Tel.)
E-Mail: t.lodderstedt at telekom.de<mailto:t.lodderstedt at telekom.de>
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