[Openid-specs-heart] Is HEART profiling privacy?

[Scott Shorter]

Hi Adrian,

Let me try to convince you that there's no need for HEART to be profiling privacy and that trying to do so would do more harm than good.

While I concur with the premise that HEART should not be profiling privacy, I do not agree that that is what is currently being proposed.  As I mentioned on the call I believe the issue at hand is access control rather than privacy.

During today's HEART call we agreed that "Alice completely trusts her UMA Authorization Server."

I believe that the proposed statement is incomplete until it specifies what Alice “completely trusts” her AS to do.  I suggest instead that “Alice trusts her UMA Authorization Server to enforce the access control policy.”  Questions of specifically how to protect Alice’s privacy using those access control settings are beyond the scope of the profile, but discussion of how access control would be implemented in the profile is quite appropriate.

So the discussion is not about “profiling privacy” so much as identifying the access control settings that make sense in the context of the use case.   Specifying that the AS is responsible for enforcing an access control policy is well within the scope of defining a profile.  It also makes sense for a use case to specify that certain resources are expected to be protected by default.

I think we agree that the profile should not “profile privacy” by specifying on Alice’s behalf what data may or may not be shared, but it seems entirely in the scope of the effort to stipulate that the Authorization Server will enforce Alice’s expected access control policy.  A specific use case can even describe the access control policies that are assumed to be in place, and the ways that Alice might modify them, as a way to illustrate the capabilities enabled by the profile.

Thanks,
Scott

Scott Shorter - Vice President, Security
sshorter at kimbleassociates.com<mailto:sshorter at kimbleassociates.com>
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