[Openid-specs-heart] CHIME Launches $1M Challenge to Solve Patient ID Problem

Aaron Seib, NATE aaron.seib at nate-trust.org
Sat Jan 30 20:12:18 UTC 2016


I agree with Adrian - 

 

 

Aaron Seib, CEO

@CaptBlueButton 

 (o) 301-540-2311

(m) 301-326-6843

cid:image001.jpg at 01D10761.5BE2FE00

 

From: Openid-specs-heart [mailto:openid-specs-heart-bounces at lists.openid.net] On Behalf Of Adrian Gropper
Sent: Saturday, January 30, 2016 2:42 PM
To: Eve Maler
Cc: wg-uma at kantarainitiative.org WG; openid-specs-heart at lists.openid.net
Subject: Re: [Openid-specs-heart] CHIME Launches $1M Challenge to Solve Patient ID Problem

 

Eve,

 

This is not silly at all and it may or may not be about UMA. The subject of this thread is the so-called "Patient ID Problem". Here's a decent definition, from different perspectives of the problem: http://www.statnews.com/2016/01/28/experts-argue-unique-patient-identifier/

 

As your IAM 101 tutorial makes clear, "The OAuth relationship that Alice forms between the two services therefore can be effectively pseudonymous."

Whether UMA likes it or not, it is squarely at the nexus between the pseudonimity of OAuth and the patient ID problem. Pretending that the UMA AS is separable, in practice, from the unique patient identifier simply confuses the issue and the role of HEART. 

 

FHIR is a direct connection between two institutions with their separate and hidden primary key for one person. The authorization system that manages that connection is HEART. There are only two possibilities: Either the patient is directly involved in establishing the correspondence of the two primary keys, or some institution is responsible for establishing that correspondence. In the US, for example, we have Surescripts claiming to be able to establish this correspondence for 230 Million people, whether they like it or not. (That's probably more than the NSA wants to claim.)

 

The patient ID problem will be solved by some combination of these two paths. Whether either one uses UMA and HEART is not silly at all.

 

Adrian

 


On Saturday, January 30, 2016, Eve Maler <eve.maler at forgerock.com> wrote:

I'm sorry, but this is getting just a bit silly. This is IAM 101.

 

When Alice uses any online service, the service knows how to distinguish her vs. any other individual who uses the service. Typically the mechanism used is "accounts" and Alice accesses her singular account by confirming (authenticating) herself*; the service matches that individual to some primary key associated with the account that can be thought of as an "identifier". So whatever primary key(s) can serve roughly as an "identity" for her.

 

An AS is a kind of service that typically uses such a mechanism, particularly when the service serves lots of individuals. An RS is also a kind of service that typically uses such a mechanism. UMA does not depend at all on the value of any primary key ("identifier") being the same in both cases. The OAuth relationship that Alice forms between the two services therefore can be effectively pseudonymous.

 

The way that Alice confirms her identity ("authenticates") to each service could be strong or weak, as appropriate. Biometrics (not always a guarantee of authentication strength, particularly when not combined with other factors/methods) might or might not be involved.

 

If a service serves exactly one individual, it's up to that service and that individual how the two are bound together. In that special case, the usual IAM mechanisms could be messed with quite a bit, though if you're building a software stack, it would probably cost a lot more to "go off the rails" and build all this from scratch than to use off-the-shelf parts and well-vetted standards that this existing software knows how to work with. Also people know how to "log in" to services, and they might not know how to "do something else" to interact with a service that's custom just for them (though this objection could be overcome, of course).

 

Stepping away from authentication, what you (I think) have been talking about is an AS whose identity as a service technically literally also represents the identity of its individual. That is not the typical job of any service I know, and UMA hasn't been designed for it either.

 

*For techies reading this, I'm not getting into session management here! :-)

Eve Maler
ForgeRock Office of the CTO | VP Innovation & Emerging Technology
Cell +1 425.345.6756 | Skype: xmlgrrl | Twitter: @xmlgrrl
New ForgeRock Identity Platform <https://www.forgerock.com>  with UMA support <https://www.forgerock.com/platform/user-managed-access/>  and an OpenUMA community <https://forgerock.org/openuma/> !

 

On Fri, Jan 29, 2016 at 7:31 AM, Adrian Gropper <agropper at healthurl.com <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','agropper at healthurl.com');> > wrote:

What is singular identity of the RO? Is it equivalent to biometric identity a la iris scan done by the RS?

 

In that case, can the AS be associated with one persona of the RO?

 

What protocol changes would be required?

 

Adrian



On Friday, January 29, 2016, Eve Maler <eve.maler at forgerock.com <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','eve.maler at forgerock.com');> > wrote:

UMA as designed is well compatible with n ROs and 1 AS, where the AS is an always-on service acting in the interests of each of the ROs in turn. (Think about how a SaaS service represents and serves each of its users without mixing them up.)

 

It can be technically compatible with 1 RO and 1 AS as well in the exact same way, but things start to break down when others in the ecosystem want to make a hard assumption that the identity of the AS (as an agent of the RO) is "as good as knowing" the singular identity of the RO it represents. This would require protocol changes.




Eve Maler
ForgeRock Office of the CTO | VP Innovation & Emerging Technology
Cell +1 425.345.6756 <tel:%2B1%20425.345.6756>  | Skype: xmlgrrl | Twitter: @xmlgrrl
New ForgeRock Identity Platform <https://www.forgerock.com>  with UMA support <https://www.forgerock.com/platform/user-managed-access/>  and an OpenUMA community <https://forgerock.org/openuma/> !

 

On Mon, Jan 25, 2016 at 12:31 PM, Adrian Gropper <agropper at healthurl.com> wrote:

Eve, can you unpack the technical solution point that you're making? Are you saying that an n:1 solution is currently incompatible with a 1:1 solution and which role is on either side of the : ?

Adrian

 

On Mon, Jan 25, 2016 at 3:23 PM, Eve Maler <eve.maler at forgerock.com> wrote:

I'm very glad to see this clear elucidation of where the splits in understanding/belief are.

 

The UMA WG's design center never actually assumed or required a strict 1:1 relationship between RO and AS, as can be seen in the charter <http://kantarainitiative.org/confluence/display/uma/Charter>  and requirements and design principles <http://kantarainitiative.org/confluence/display/uma/UMA+Requirements> .

 

The nature of agency law, as I understand it, is precisely to ensure that the agent's interests align properly with those of the principal so that the agent acts within their authority when they act on behalf of the principal. This should hold true whether there is a 1:1 or n:1 relationship, and it's part of why the UMA legal subgroup is doing its work.

 

Of course, if technology can do a good job of keeping an agent in line, then a legal remedy might not be required. But so far, I haven't seen jwk be a good candidate for a technical solution.

 

People have asked me about various encryption or DRM solutions being used on top of UMA. Generally my response to them is that they can use such a thing if they want to. However, solutions involving encryption can impose costs that many ecosystems can't bear (particularly wide ecosystems with lots of third-party clients -- witness OAuth V1.0), and often the players end up treating such requirements as failure and route around them by emailing content or sharing passwords. :-) Access control systems must make the right thing to do be the easiest thing to do.




Eve Maler
ForgeRock Office of the CTO | VP Innovation & Emerging Technology
Cell +1 425.345.6756 <tel:%2B1%20425.345.6756>  | Skype: xmlgrrl | Twitter: @xmlgrrl
Join our ForgeRock.org OpenUMA <http://forgerock.org/openuma/>  community!

 

On Mon, Jan 25, 2016 at 9:32 AM, Adrian Gropper <agropper at healthurl.com> wrote:

(apologies for cross-posting)

 

Thanks, Josh. As always, you are able to explain the issue much better than me. This is why I've tried my best to understand the gaps between UMA as it is today and something that lays cliaim to user-managed access. FHIR and UMA and, consequently, HEART are all new and we need to be very clear about how we design this next generation of protocols.

 

In the UMA legal subgroup, we've tried to map UMA into "Agency Law", the relatively simple branch of law that dictates how an individual (patient) can specify an agent (as in lawyer, accountant, or doctor) to act on their behalf. Suffice it to say, that agency law does not assume that an agent will have any conflict of interest in the baseline case but that conflicts of interest can arise in the real world (for example when a broker is put in an agency role).

 

It's up to all of us, FHIR, UMA, and HEART, to develop around the requirement for agency on the part of the individual. We can layer on all sorts of other complexities to deal with brokerage and jurisdictional issues, but if we don't start with clear personal agency in the Authorization Server, then we will keep chasing the increased complexity and insecurity of our networks for another 10 years.

 

Adrian



On Monday, January 25, 2016, Josh Mandel <Joshua.Mandel at childrens.harvard.edu> wrote:

That's illuminating, at least. It sounds like you're interested in changing the underlying protocol (i.e. effectively designing something new instead of UMA). There's nothing wrong with that, but making these changes implicitly and then calling the new thing "UMA" is exacerbating the confusion on this list.

 

Also, I can't help responding to the following comment that you made on #5:

You're mixing up the identity of an authorization service with the identity of a user or persona.

 

 -- that's exactly correct! Using the AS's public key to identify the user would be mixing up the identity of the AS with the user. That's exactly why I'm saying you *cannot equate* them. So perhaps we agree on this point at least :-)

 

  -J 

 

On Mon, Jan 25, 2016 at 11:56 AM, Adrian Gropper <agropper at healthurl.com> wrote:

 

 

On Mon, Jan 25, 2016 at 11:49 AM, Josh Mandel <Joshua.Mandel at childrens.harvard.edu> wrote:

Adrian, I'm afraid we're talking past one another here. Let me try to spell out the logic and see if you follow and agree with each step:

 

1. UMA allows a user to stand up her own Authorization Server

Yes 

2. UMA does not require a user to stand up her own Authorization Server

I don't know. It may be that's the only way for an UMA-like approach to privacy and security to scale. 

3. Given #2, an UMA-based protocol cannot assume that every user will stand up her own Authorization Server

Why not? Can't a service host an arbitrary number of AS? 

4. Given #3, an UMA-based protocol must assume that some Authorization Servers will work on behalf of multiple users

That depends on how we choose to define Authorization Server. 

5. Given #4, an UMA-based protocol cannot equate an Authorization Server's identity with a user's identity

You're mixing up the identity of an authorization service with the identity of a user or persona. 

6. Given #5, an UMA-based protocol cannot use an Authorization Servers public key to identify a user.

It's all in how we define Authorization Server, isn't it?

Adrian 

 

Is there a point at which you disagree?

 

  -J 

 

On Mon, Jan 25, 2016 at 11:40 AM, Adrian Gropper <agropper at healthurl.com> wrote:

No, I'm not saying anything about how the public key associated with a persona is used for encrypting messages to the client. The use of a public key the way to identify a persona or account is already well established in blockchain and is completely compatible with a personal owned AS. That's all I'm saying. 

The use of whatever keys or tokens will be used in messaging between the RS and the Client is up to the "security folk" Justin refers to. Are the security folk saying that having a personal persona AS is impossible? 

Adrian

 

On Mon, Jan 25, 2016 at 11:34 AM, Josh Mandel <Joshua.Mandel at childrens.harvard.edu> wrote:

In UMA, the RS does indeed learn the AS's public key (by asking the AS). But the public key is not used in the way you seem to want (namely, it's not used to encrypt any patient data). It sounds to me like you're focusing on an implementation detail (the fact that the AS happens to have a public key associated with it), and extrapolating to some unfounded conclusions (that this forms the basis for encrypting patient data with a patient-specific key) from that detail.

 

  -J

 

On Mon, Jan 25, 2016 at 11:26 AM, Adrian Gropper <agropper at healthurl.com> wrote:

Justin, 

All I'm saying is that each patient persona gets to have a private key and that key is kept safe in their AS - period. 

Let's start with that, and then the security folks can tell us how the RS gets the Client's public key. Can't UMA do that?

Adrian

 

On Mon, Jan 25, 2016 at 11:02 AM, Justin Richer <jricher at mit.edu> wrote:

The way encryption is handled between the RS and the Client does not follow from the right to choose an AS and has nothing to do with the AS’s JWK. Think about it this way: how would the client get the AS’s private key to decrypt the message? 

 

 — Justin

 

On Jan 25, 2016, at 10:52 AM, Adrian Gropper <agropper at healthurl.com> wrote:

 

I think we're mostly all on the same wavelength. The first priority is to bake the right to control one's own AS and the corresponding jwk into FHIR and HEART. This should be easy to reach consensus on given recent OCR guidance that includes the "right to delegate access to a third party". 

The way encryption is handled between the RS and Client follows from the above.

Adrian

 

On Mon, Jan 25, 2016 at 10:38 AM, Josh Mandel <Joshua.Mandel at childrens.harvard.edu> wrote:

Let's generously read Adrian's claim here as "a patient who cares enough can set up her own AS, and thereby ensure that her AS's jwk is unique to her". So yes, you can (with enough effort -- which might be driven down by technology) get to the point of one jwk per AS, if you really want.

 

But even if you do so, the AS's jwk in HEART isn't really an "encryption key" sense in the way Adrian would have it. In other words, the AS's jwk is not used as an "encryption key" for the patient's healthcare data at any point. (It is used to sign tokens in the UMA flow, including the PAT and the AAT.)

 

By the way, http://openid.bitbucket.org/HEART/openid-heart-uma.html#rfc.section.2.1 <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__openid.bitbucket.org_HEART_openid-2Dheart-2Duma.html-23rfc.section.2.1&d=BQMFaQ&c=qS4goWBT7poplM69zy_3xhKwEW14JZMSdioCoppxeFU&r=c7b1QeR755-dBx2b0xnlepDTylromoEzcLl-6ixmBL3TpXSxSvtAvT553fzSgLpm&m=6qsDGXlfn6YB2nKRHOhQbq7-F60_1nlM8F6SOwyMwac&s=h493E96bkQd-wdHQtG9rOI29YYNBoODJ5dv5jBohH8M&e=>  says that an "aud" claim in the AAT specifies the "RPT authorization endpoint"; UMA refers to this as simply the "RPT endpoint", and I think the HEART profile's language should be consistent (this tripped me up for 10min just now).

 

  -J

 

 

 

On Mon, Jan 25, 2016 at 10:02 AM, Adrian Gropper <agropper at healthurl.com> wrote:

Why "most likely not"? Is it a security issue? a cost issue? We don't have to compromise privacy for security in our connected world.

 

On Mon, Jan 25, 2016 at 9:55 AM, Justin Richer <jricher at mit.edu> wrote:

But it's not like that, the arity is very different. 

Every record is associated with an AS, perhaps a separate AS for each record/patient but most likely not.

Every AS is associated with a jwks_uri, but only one per AS. 

 -- Justin

 

On 1/25/2016 9:02 AM, Adrian Gropper wrote:

It means that every patient record is associated with a separate jwks_uri for that patient's AS.

 

On Mon, Jan 25, 2016 at 8:59 AM, Justin Richer <jricher at mit.edu> wrote:

Yes you did. Quote:

"The system is also much more resistant to data breaches as data holders (UMA Resource Servers) must implement separate encryption keys for each patient."

So if you don't mean separately encrypting the data for each user, what does that statement mean? The access token isn't an encryption key. 

 -- Justin 

 

On 1/25/2016 8:57 AM, Adrian Gropper wrote:

I never said anything about how the data is encrypted. I only talk about how access to the FHIR API is controlled.

Adrian

 

On Mon, Jan 25, 2016 at 8:55 AM, Justin Richer <jricher at mit.edu> wrote:

Adrian,

I've asked this before and thought we'd settled it, but it keeps coming up: where are you getting the idea of encrypting the data to the patient using a patient's key? That is not in scope for HEART, nor is it part of any of the underlying protocols.

 -- Justin 

 

On 1/25/2016 8:52 AM, Adrian Gropper wrote:

Establishing a separate URI for each patient is likely to be the only stable solution to the patient ID problem. The issue, however, is how many URIs will a patient be allowed to have? If the URIs are coercive, in the sense of a chip or tattoo issued by government or an equivalent global authority (Facebook?) or the URI is derived from DNA or an iris scan. (Iris scans are a good positive IDs and can be read from 30 feet away with modern technology.)

Let's assume, for our purposes, that an iris scanner costs about as much as a credit card terminal, cheap enough for every front office, ambulance, and police car. Is the patient ID problem solved? I don't think so.

Patients can have one or more separate URIs in order to help manage their health records. Today, we typically use email address for this purpose, with WebFinger https://webfinger.net/ <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__webfinger.net_&d=BQMFaQ&c=qS4goWBT7poplM69zy_3xhKwEW14JZMSdioCoppxeFU&r=c7b1QeR755-dBx2b0xnlepDTylromoEzcLl-6ixmBL3TpXSxSvtAvT553fzSgLpm&m=2VMieJq3EmwTLglsueFRPjnL6SoON964_PI0l93fF_Q&s=qupbYXH4yZuzhNsgW0jcwq786o--G6D1m7GlkENe1lw&e=>  as a standardized way to discover linked attributes such as the patient's UMA Authorization Server and the associated public key. 

UMA for patient ID brings numerous benefits including much greater transparency and security. The patient now has a single portal (their UMA AS) to view all current relationships under that particular patient ID persona. The system is also much more resistant to data breaches as data holders (UMA Resource Servers) must implement separate encryption keys for each patient.

I think the HEART group is in a good position to compete for the CHIME challenge on this basis and I'd be happy for me and PPR to help organize a submission.

Adrian

 

On Sun, Jan 24, 2016 at 1:20 PM, Aaron Seib <aaron.seib at nate-trust.org> wrote:

I appreciate your expertise and action.  

 

I don't necessarily agree with some of your statements here but that is the beauty of open processes.  

 

Let's strive to do all we can - together.

 

 

 

Aaron Seib 

@CaptBlueButton

(O) 301-540-9549

(M) 301-326-6843

 

"The trick to earning trust is to avoid all tricks.  Including tricks on yourself."

 



-------- Original message --------
From: "Glen Marshall [SRS]" <gfm at securityrs.com> 
Date: 2016/01/24 7:07 AM (GMT-08:00) 
To: HEART List <openid-specs-heart at lists.openid.net> 
Subject: [Openid-specs-heart] CHIME Launches $1M Challenge to Solve Patient ID Problem 

This is pertinent to our data-sharing use cases.  There is no current solution to accurately sharing/gathering patients' clinical data stored among various repositories.  In turn, that makes applying access controls across all of a patient's data in those repositories difficult.   I'm happy to see Chime's challenge.

However, the related problem of discovering where all of one's data might be is computationally intractable.  It is equally intractable to gather and combine all access permissions and regulatory restrictions on patients' data, even if there were a useful means to do so.  (Both are equivalent to the halting problem <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__en.wikipedia.org_wiki_Halting-5Fproblem&d=BQMFaQ&c=qS4goWBT7poplM69zy_3xhKwEW14JZMSdioCoppxeFU&r=c7b1QeR755-dBx2b0xnlepDTylromoEzcLl-6ixmBL3TpXSxSvtAvT553fzSgLpm&m=2VMieJq3EmwTLglsueFRPjnL6SoON964_PI0l93fF_Q&s=eVT2hXrUini0He7H6c-zHwPxd4ROV6nwfZ53AECX76o&e=> .)

Having a single "source of truth" repository is one direction for a solution, as is having a single access permissions source.  Keeping them updated with new data and permissions is possible, even if difficult in the short run.

However, establishing unique URIs for each patient's data and permissions is the same as having a universal patient identifier.  That might be subject to current Congressional funding restrictions.   


The College of Healthcare Information Management Executives on Tuesday launched a $1 million National Patient ID Challenge to develop solutions to ensure 100 percent accuracy of every patient’s identity to reduce preventable medical errors.

http://www.healthdatamanagement.com/news/chime-launches-1m-challenge-to-solve-patient-id-problem <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.healthdatamanagement.com_news_chime-2Dlaunches-2D1m-2Dchallenge-2Dto-2Dsolve-2Dpatient-2Did-2Dproblem&d=BQMFaQ&c=qS4goWBT7poplM69zy_3xhKwEW14JZMSdioCoppxeFU&r=c7b1QeR755-dBx2b0xnlepDTylromoEzcLl-6ixmBL3TpXSxSvtAvT553fzSgLpm&m=2VMieJq3EmwTLglsueFRPjnL6SoON964_PI0l93fF_Q&s=_qW1n-yVrg_DP1kqs-CW-XiipWZapB1GXpTiUdB-pMo&e=> 

-- 

Glen F. Marshall
Consultant
Security Risk Solutions, Inc.
698 Fishermans Bend
Mount Pleasant, SC 29464
Tel: (610) 644-2452 <tel:%28610%29%20644-2452> 
Mobile: (610) 613-3084 <tel:%28610%29%20613-3084> 
gfm at securityrs.com
www.SecurityRiskSolutions.com <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.SecurityRiskSolutions.com&d=BQMFaQ&c=qS4goWBT7poplM69zy_3xhKwEW14JZMSdioCoppxeFU&r=c7b1QeR755-dBx2b0xnlepDTylromoEzcLl-6ixmBL3TpXSxSvtAvT553fzSgLpm&m=2VMieJq3EmwTLglsueFRPjnL6SoON964_PI0l93fF_Q&s=sO0EFn2RDc6nTcNVSjD-lEfCdZqy-TatdAT6ccpnTZI&e=> 


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Adrian Gropper MD

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Adrian Gropper MD

PROTECT YOUR FUTURE - RESTORE Health Privacy!
HELP us fight for the right to control personal health data.
DONATE:  <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__patientprivacyrights.org_donate-2D2_&d=BQMFaQ&c=qS4goWBT7poplM69zy_3xhKwEW14JZMSdioCoppxeFU&r=c7b1QeR755-dBx2b0xnlepDTylromoEzcLl-6ixmBL3TpXSxSvtAvT553fzSgLpm&m=2VMieJq3EmwTLglsueFRPjnL6SoON964_PI0l93fF_Q&s=z-4rXqaGl6wWaDWmWBhUiw11pQ596WWRLsAHF3kxUgM&e=> http://patientprivacyrights.org/donate-2/ 

 




-- 

 

Adrian Gropper MD

PROTECT YOUR FUTURE - RESTORE Health Privacy!
HELP us fight for the right to control personal health data.
DONATE:  <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__patientprivacyrights.org_donate-2D2_&d=BQMFaQ&c=qS4goWBT7poplM69zy_3xhKwEW14JZMSdioCoppxeFU&r=c7b1QeR755-dBx2b0xnlepDTylromoEzcLl-6ixmBL3TpXSxSvtAvT553fzSgLpm&m=2VMieJq3EmwTLglsueFRPjnL6SoON964_PI0l93fF_Q&s=z-4rXqaGl6wWaDWmWBhUiw11pQ596WWRLsAHF3kxUgM&e=> http://patientprivacyrights.org/donate-2/ 


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Adrian Gropper MD

PROTECT YOUR FUTURE - RESTORE Health Privacy!
HELP us fight for the right to control personal health data.
DONATE:  <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__patientprivacyrights.org_donate-2D2_&d=BQMFaQ&c=qS4goWBT7poplM69zy_3xhKwEW14JZMSdioCoppxeFU&r=c7b1QeR755-dBx2b0xnlepDTylromoEzcLl-6ixmBL3TpXSxSvtAvT553fzSgLpm&m=6qsDGXlfn6YB2nKRHOhQbq7-F60_1nlM8F6SOwyMwac&s=rAJTxml04Ym8Bi0-vj0w_QpsXopAevr1vwGI1Qko-Jw&e=> http://patientprivacyrights.org/donate-2/ 

 




-- 

 

Adrian Gropper MD

PROTECT YOUR FUTURE - RESTORE Health Privacy!
HELP us fight for the right to control personal health data.
DONATE:  <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__patientprivacyrights.org_donate-2D2_&d=BQMFaQ&c=qS4goWBT7poplM69zy_3xhKwEW14JZMSdioCoppxeFU&r=c7b1QeR755-dBx2b0xnlepDTylromoEzcLl-6ixmBL3TpXSxSvtAvT553fzSgLpm&m=6qsDGXlfn6YB2nKRHOhQbq7-F60_1nlM8F6SOwyMwac&s=rAJTxml04Ym8Bi0-vj0w_QpsXopAevr1vwGI1Qko-Jw&e=> http://patientprivacyrights.org/donate-2/ 

 




-- 

 

Adrian Gropper MD

PROTECT YOUR FUTURE - RESTORE Health Privacy!
HELP us fight for the right to control personal health data.
DONATE:  <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__patientprivacyrights.org_donate-2D2_&d=BQMFaQ&c=qS4goWBT7poplM69zy_3xhKwEW14JZMSdioCoppxeFU&r=c7b1QeR755-dBx2b0xnlepDTylromoEzcLl-6ixmBL3TpXSxSvtAvT553fzSgLpm&m=1UaGqWJeKd4UdDAld99dOkLSgTEJUfV8Vu3sylh0h5E&s=mJ4JXE5T1szAX1UEoejeV2TSq_kh1t6enN2DsyBOd5g&e=> http://patientprivacyrights.org/donate-2/ 

 




-- 

 

Adrian Gropper MD

PROTECT YOUR FUTURE - RESTORE Health Privacy!
HELP us fight for the right to control personal health data.
DONATE:  <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__patientprivacyrights.org_donate-2D2_&d=BQMFaQ&c=qS4goWBT7poplM69zy_3xhKwEW14JZMSdioCoppxeFU&r=c7b1QeR755-dBx2b0xnlepDTylromoEzcLl-6ixmBL3TpXSxSvtAvT553fzSgLpm&m=w3SjjqRMdmtH3aphsxB60HkTmVUKOv5ObNc_9eJxmtY&s=5L56gsnzOm5hcTK0lJvbihx2PFR-5L-hscdP5z__0WE&e=> http://patientprivacyrights.org/donate-2/ 

 



-- 

 

Adrian Gropper MD

PROTECT YOUR FUTURE - RESTORE Health Privacy!
HELP us fight for the right to control personal health data.
DONATE:  <http://patientprivacyrights.org/donate-2/> http://patientprivacyrights.org/donate-2/ 

 


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-- 

 

Adrian Gropper MD

PROTECT YOUR FUTURE - RESTORE Health Privacy!
HELP us fight for the right to control personal health data.
DONATE:  <http://patientprivacyrights.org/donate-2/> http://patientprivacyrights.org/donate-2/ 

 



-- 

 

Adrian Gropper MD

PROTECT YOUR FUTURE - RESTORE Health Privacy!
HELP us fight for the right to control personal health data.
DONATE:  <http://patientprivacyrights.org/donate-2/> http://patientprivacyrights.org/donate-2/ 

 

 



-- 

 

Adrian Gropper MD

PROTECT YOUR FUTURE - RESTORE Health Privacy!
HELP us fight for the right to control personal health data.
DONATE:  <http://patientprivacyrights.org/donate-2/> http://patientprivacyrights.org/donate-2/ 

 

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