[Openid-specs-heart] HEART Scopes & Resource Sets

Wed Jun 17 12:34:31 UTC 2015

Yes a few of us participated in the PoF effort.  I get the tagging for
provider to provider (covered entity to covered entity CFR 42 part 2 ?
Stuff)  but in consumer exchange .... how does the extend beyond those
borders?   API Mashup exchange will be much broader than the use of FHIR
API.  How will those tags be respected or even acknowledged ... do they
need to be,

Will the PHR be expected to honor?  How does that get normalized to general
access control?  In the demonstration we assumed the apps would ignore the
tagging.  Will there be scopes replicated elsewhere

Very blurry to me at the moment.

Thanks for the links they are always so helpful!
On Jun 17, 2015 8:02 AM, "Moehrke, John (GE Healthcare)" <
John.Moehrke at med.ge.com> wrote:

>  Debbie,
>
>
>
> The DS4P tagging is baked right into the FHIR spec… so it is there for us
> to use (or not).
>
>
>
> For others, what this means is that all FHIR resources have a common
> header (was external HTTP based metadata originally, but now inside the
> resource at the top). This common header has a well-known place for
> ‘security-tags’, and a recommended vocabulary for use. This vocabulary is
> made up of a set of vocabulary designed over the years in HL7 (and other
> healthcare standards): Sensitivity classifications (the kinds of medical
> data that have specific sensitivity or regulated behavior), Confidentiality
> classification (privacy risk rating on a scale), Obligations, Compartments,
> and Integrity classifications. This is an extendable vocabulary so capable
> of more.
>
>
> http://healthcaresecprivacy.blogspot.com/2013/09/hl7-ballot-healthcare-securityprivacy.html
>
>
>
> This vocabulary was the focal point for “Privacy on FHIR” demonstrations,
> along with consent.
>
>
> http://healthcaresecprivacy.blogspot.com/2013/10/fhir-demonstration-of-ds4p.html
>
>
>
> It is important to note that this metadata tagging system is there to be
> used. It is not magically filled out, nor magically used. So it is
> important to both set it correctly (where there have been a few
> demonstrations of how to automate this), and use it during enforcement.
>
>
>
> John
>
>
>
> *From:* Openid-specs-heart [mailto:
> openid-specs-heart-bounces at lists.openid.net] *On Behalf Of *Debbie Bucci
> *Sent:* Wednesday, June 17, 2015 5:03 AM
> *To:* Eve Maler
> *Cc:* openid-specs-heart at lists.openid.net
> *Subject:* Re: [Openid-specs-heart] HEART Scopes & Resource Sets
>
>
>
>  This thread is touching on everything that I thought it would  ...
>
>  I am going to boil this down to the internal conversation we had over the
> weekend -
>
> A. FHIR scope interop between OAUTH/UMA
> B. Current gap (perhaps in both specs!) that is leaning towards  or could
> inform UMA extension
> C.  Overarching access control/ABAC conversation   - that John seems to
> have touch upon.   I have a whole bunch of questions there ... If FHIR
> resources/attributes are being used for the PIP - are they being used for
> enforcement (PEP) as well - is DS4P like FHIR tagging on the table?  Will
> vendors implement? ... (no need to answer just throwing them out there )
>
> If we will focus on A .. that should inform B  - but others are interested
> - perhaps and entirely different thread/conversation  is needed for C
>
>   In re: to vectors -- consent related -  sensitive health topics and
> delegation are two areas I believe are relevant for this WG.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On Tue, Jun 16, 2015 at 2:06 PM, Eve Maler <eve.maler at forgerock.com>
> wrote:
>
> Hi Thomas-- Delegation in this sense (actively choosing to assign
> authorization rights to someone else) is something I'm working on a lot
> lately. ("Delegation" is a word with a lot of meanings, sigh.) Obviously,
> Alice-to-Bob sharing is supposed to be a key UMA benefit.
>
>
>
> I think you're using "scope" in an odd sense by talking about "creating a
> new scope for Bob". It's more like a policy in that case, or a policy
> template or something. Or maybe you're suggesting that, through family
> relationships, there's a kind of role basis for sharing ("mother-daughter")
> that determines policy workflow, and when Bob differs enough from a
> standard role, you have to peel him away from it. (Though God help us if we
> replicate RBAC for ordinary consumers and patients. It doesn't even scale
> in the enterprise.)
>
>
>
> As for propagation, this may be a bit far afield for the main topic under
> discussion in this thread, but for those who are interested, I see some
> huge potential for how to drive layers of sharing policy off of graph
> technology. (My colleagues recently did a forward-looking demo
> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www.youtube.com_watch-3Fv-3D-2DBAyu4KuSOI-26index-3D8-26list-3DPLK58Vrtd56-2DU4YkavFo0DR1yFpkw9G-5Flm&d=AwMFaQ&c=IV_clAzoPDE253xZdHuilRgztyh_RiV3wUrLrDQYWSI&r=B4hg7NQHul-cxfpT_e9Lh49ujUftqzJ6q17C2t3eI64&m=obrSrEtKlaPoG6Y_3IGsfj7Kn3vOG0bVgWHnEd0zTWE&s=yf0AGqugbRYOrut9NkwbXs1TyQyjg7GqHlNc4AIrLZ4&e=>
> of graph-driven policy with an IoT bent (24:00).)
>
>
>
> *Eve Maler *ForgeRock Office of the CTO | VP Innovation & Emerging
> Technology
> Cell +1 425.345.6756 | Skype: xmlgrrl | Twitter: @xmlgrrl
> Join our ForgeRock.org OpenUMA
> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__forgerock.org_openuma_&d=AwMFaQ&c=IV_clAzoPDE253xZdHuilRgztyh_RiV3wUrLrDQYWSI&r=B4hg7NQHul-cxfpT_e9Lh49ujUftqzJ6q17C2t3eI64&m=obrSrEtKlaPoG6Y_3IGsfj7Kn3vOG0bVgWHnEd0zTWE&s=u2vKFCtEm_0Q_5jC4K8Lq9pHWid6xUihJqDLbOz7O4w&e=>
> community!
>
>
>
> On Tue, Jun 16, 2015 at 8:42 AM, Thomas Hardjono <hardjono at mit.edu> wrote:
>
>
> Folks,
>
> Sorry for having been absent for a while.
>
> >>> Eve:
> >>> In discussions with consumer IoT folks, it
> >>> seems that smart light bulbs want to be
> >>> gathered by "room".
>
> So this is the second time in two weeks that I've heard discussions about
> resources/scopes and OAuth2.0 (the other venue was related to IoT).
>
> (1) One of the problems with grouping resources (what we call "resource
> sets" here) is that there are always cases where there is an exception to
> the access being granted. For example, Alice has created a "resource set"
> called "lighting in the house". She wants to grant Bob (the electrician)
> access to this resource set with the exception of lighting in the kitchen,
> say. So the access control logic has to be able to handle this
> semantically. If there too many exceptions to the resource-set scope, then
> you may as well create a new scope just for Bob.
>
> (2) Relationships as a "resource" or "scope":  Should relationships be
> expressed as a resource or scope (or both/neither)? So in Josh's example,
> Alice and her Mom have a relationship that allows Mom to say "I grant my
> daughter permission to read my Med files". Not to get theoretical, but what
> if Alice has a sister Cathy who also qualifies as "daughter-of".
>
>
> I'm not sure if the OAuth WG ever addressed these issues, but in the UMA
> WG we really haven't addressed them sufficiently (too busy getting UMA core
> 1.0 finished). We also haven't addressed the issue of delegation and
> propagation of delegated rights.
>
> /thomas/
>
>
> ____________________________________________
>
>
> From: Openid-specs-heart [mailto:
> openid-specs-heart-bounces at lists.openid.net] On Behalf Of Justin Richer
> Sent: Tuesday, June 16, 2015 10:42 AM
> To: Eve Maler
> Cc: openid-specs-heart at lists.openid.net
> Subject: Re: [Openid-specs-heart] HEART Scopes & Resource Sets
>
>
> Eve,
>
> The main difference is that it’s not at all uncommon in the OAuth world to
> ask for authorization to multiple resources protected by the same AS
> simultaneously. In fact, this is seen as a *feature* of the OAuth approach,
> since it’s lower decision overhead for the user (when done right). In that
> case, if a client asks for “read write delete” scopes of an AS, the AS
> still needs to know *what* those scopes apply to. Since OAuth doesn’t have
> any type of resource or audience identifier (a big hole in the spec), this
> gap has been usually filled by having a scope identify the resource. Note
> that this is still semantically sensible and doesn’t go against what
> “scope” is defined as.
>
> This is where you get the matrix definition. You’ve got some scopes that
> mean “where can I do things” and others that mean “what can I do there”. I
> think Josh’s approach of “what.where” is reasonable given this technical
> constraint, and not without precedent. As far as the AS is concerned, it’s
> dealing with just strings from the client, but it can still easily make the
> UX of the authorization page a little smart based on the understood
> semantics of these well-defined scopes.
>
>  — Justin
>
> On Jun 15, 2015, at 7:44 PM, Eve Maler <eve.maler at forgerock.com> wrote:
>
> Hi Josh-- Below...
>
>
> Eve Maler
> ForgeRock Office of the CTO | VP Innovation & Emerging Technology
> Cell +1 425.345.6756 | Skype: xmlgrrl | Twitter: @xmlgrrl
> Join our ForgeRock.org OpenUMA community!
>
> On Mon, Jun 15, 2015 at 2:24 PM, Josh Mandel <
> Joshua.Mandel at childrens.harvard.edu> wrote:
> Hi all,
>
> I didn't mean to take a hard-line position on today's call about scope
> definitions! To my mind, our approach to scopes will need to work
> hand-in-hand with our approach to endpoint (or resource set) discovery --
> so I feel a bit awkward discussing scopes here in isolation. But that said,
> let me see if I can at least highlight the tension that we heard in the
> past hour's discussion (in a neutral way):
>
> ---
> Goal: Whatever the model, we want to support a use case where Alice signs
> into her resource server and can set some policies in an intuitive way.
> |She'd see something like (very, very roughly):
>
>  My Medications:
>  * Who can view?
>  * Who can write new prescriptions?
>
> My Step Counts
>  * Who can view?
>  * Who can remove?
> ---
>
> The question is about how this works under the hood.  I think we were
> discussing two models:
>
> Model 1: The "UMA-First" approach
> We have a resource set like "Alice's Medications", with scopes like "view"
> and "prescribe". And we'd have a resource set like "Alice's Step Counts"
> with scopes like "view" and "delete".
>
> Model 2: The "OAuth-First" approach
> We have a resource set like "Alice's FHIR Endpoint", with scopes like
> "Medications.view", "Medications.prescribe", "Steps.view", and
> "Steps.delete".
>
>
> Talking about an "OAuth-first" approach for setting policies is making me
> confused. I know what it looks like to enable OAuth-like flows in UMA when
> Alice is both the requesting party and the owner of the resource. And I
> know what it looks like to enable Alice to set policies at an UMA
> authorization server (which might hold the results of a previous OAuth-like
> flow done in UMA). But I don't know what "setting policies in OAuth" means
> because the OAuth experience is about consenting at run time (possibly
> checking and unchecking individual scopes), and revoking tokens at the
> AS/RS.
>
> So the closest UX analog would probably be the wording displayed in an
> OAuth consent dialog, maybe something like:
> • View [and prescribe] your medications
> • View [and delete] your steps
>
> If the *types* of Resource Sets and the allowed scopes are standardized in
> advance (which UMA supports), then a mapping between Model 1 and "vanilla"
> OAuth could be as simple as: "concatenate the UMA resource set type
> followed by ':' followed by the UMA scope name" -- so for example, you
> might derive an OAuth scope like "
> https://openid.net/heart/resource-types/StepCounts:https://openid.net/heart/scopes/view
> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__openid.net_heart_resource-2Dtypes_StepCounts-3Ahttps-3A__openid.net_heart_scopes_view&d=AwMFaQ&c=IV_clAzoPDE253xZdHuilRgztyh_RiV3wUrLrDQYWSI&r=B4hg7NQHul-cxfpT_e9Lh49ujUftqzJ6q17C2t3eI64&m=obrSrEtKlaPoG6Y_3IGsfj7Kn3vOG0bVgWHnEd0zTWE&s=NY3dpaK6jL3Yfkv9k_f1AhXAK9Mlwlr3Xx0bfjqEfg4&e=>".
> Or under Model 2, the scopes could be reused directly (no mapping required).
>
> In what sense is "reuse" meant here? A coding model, or an architectural
> model, or a semantic model?... There are ways in which I could imagine a
> deep kind of semantic reuse being possible without concatenation tricks
> being necessary. However, not being a developer, I'm not sure if they match
> what you're thinking of.
>
> For example, in my previous response to the minutes email, I outlined how
> some APIs have implicit mappings between scopes and acceptable
> endpoints/resources to which they apply.
>
> Let's say (totally making this up) the FHIR has two endpoints, with one
> endpoint for medication records and one for fitness steps. There's an
> UMA-standardized resource type for each. There's "
> https://www.hl7.org/fhir/rsrc/med.json
> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www.hl7.org_fhir_rsrc_med.json&d=AwMFaQ&c=IV_clAzoPDE253xZdHuilRgztyh_RiV3wUrLrDQYWSI&r=B4hg7NQHul-cxfpT_e9Lh49ujUftqzJ6q17C2t3eI64&m=obrSrEtKlaPoG6Y_3IGsfj7Kn3vOG0bVgWHnEd0zTWE&s=l-4qDmb2SMKJH01dMJA_TKP5MkEC8qec3Gg1MtrWFR4&e=>",
> with instances of it registered with scopes "view", "download", "transmit",
> and "add" (so some clients can insert new entries). Alice's medications
> might be in a resource something like "/alice/meds". (What's displayed in
> her AS dashboard might look a lot nicer than that.) And there's "
> https://www.hl7.org/fhir/rsrc/step.json
> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www.hl7.org_fhir_rsrc_step.json&d=AwMFaQ&c=IV_clAzoPDE253xZdHuilRgztyh_RiV3wUrLrDQYWSI&r=B4hg7NQHul-cxfpT_e9Lh49ujUftqzJ6q17C2t3eI64&m=obrSrEtKlaPoG6Y_3IGsfj7Kn3vOG0bVgWHnEd0zTWE&s=hEoZNPfmvLWm9VIAsdMIejdA0UrXhuHUuU30Z3Oqx68&e=>",
> with instances of it registered with scopes "view", "download", "transmit",
> and "chart". Alice's steps might be in a resource like "/alice/steps".
>
> (If the scopes are in the form of URIs, they could be standardized to a
> further degree, in that a bunch of metadata could be pulled by the
> authorization server and used to present standard labels and icons, and
> other semantics could be linked to them.)
>
> If the very same API were OAuth-protected, with the very same resource
> endpoints, there might still be the same resource endpoints, with the same
> scopes, where three of them work on both resource types, "add" only works
> on "med", and "chart" only works on "step". These resources could still
> have a standardized meaning in terms of both resource naming and
> schema/format; there just would be nowhere to "hook" a standardized
> resource type URI into.
>
> Seen this way, the OAuth approach and the UMA approach are quite similar,
> differing only in the implicitness vs. explicitness of the resource set
> layer.
>
>
> Of course, some interesting things happen when we layer in details like...
>
> What if Alice has access to multiple records (say, her own and her
> mother's)? In vanilla OAuth the binding of permissions to these records is
> generally implicit. How should they play out in UMA? Under Model 1, we'd
> probably see two more Resource Sets created ("Alice's Mom's Medications"
> and "Alice's Mom's Steps"). Under Model 2, we'd probably see one more
> Resource Set created ("Alice's Mom's FHIR Endpoint").
>
> I've been doing some work around chained delegation of this sort. Indeed,
> these are separate records, and must remain that way. Alice may not have
> all the permissions over her mother's records that she has over her own!
> One way to present such "downstream" items is to present them under a
> separate "Shared With" area. And there are various ways to organize owned
> items, e.g. by who you tend to share them with or by function. In
> discussions with consumer IoT folks, it seems that smart light bulbs want
> to be gathered by "room".
>
> FWIW...
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