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<p>Probably Mr Dombrovski has been presented with the Danish "NemID"
a <i>previously</i> bank owned eID where service providers place
a login applet on their own webpage. The 2. factor (which is
partly optional for banks) has been paperbased ch/resp. But most
recently an app redirect option has been available (and popular).
But it is implemented in a way that still makes NemID extremely
susceptible to realtime phishing.<br>
</p>
<p>There is no possibility for ordinary users to distinguish real
RP's from fake - and not even requirements for authorized RP's to
used encrypted connections.</p>
<p>It was originally planned to notify NemID under eIDAS by simply
defining NemID to have the desired security level in the "National
Standard for the Security Level of Identities". But as a result of
a public hearing this "security by mere aspiration" definition was
removed. And there is currently no intention from Danish
authorities to notify NemID under eIDAS. This is planned for a
next generation eID labeled "MitID" that will most likely be
introduced in 2021.</p>
<p>So in short the Danish eID with the new 2. factor app actually
uses redirection, but implemented in a way that still does not
qualify it to be notified as an eID under the eIDAS scheme.</p>
<p>FYI: Here is an article from the leading Danish IT-newssite
Version2 (hoping that it translates reasonably using online
translation services):<br>
<a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="https://www.version2.dk/artikel/digitaliseringsstyrelsen-efter-udvikler-angreb-ja-nemid-saarbar-phishing-1086131">https://www.version2.dk/artikel/digitaliseringsstyrelsen-efter-udvikler-angreb-ja-nemid-saarbar-phishing-1086131</a></p>
<p>Best,<br>
Henrik Biering<br>
</p>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">Den 09-03-2019 kl. 15:30 skrev nat via
Openid-specs-fapi:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:7c18ce45296d77cf8ef2f6fc1c684e23@sakimura.org">Restarting
the thread as I want to make a youtube video on this one and want
to hear your opinions.
<br>
<br>
So, Mr Dombrovskis says:
<br>
<br>
"I would like to encourage industry players to shift their
attention away from authentication methods that are redirecting
TPP customers to the banks' webpages (or apps). This cannot be the
basis for innovative and competitive European payment services.
Instead, the focus should in my view be on the development of
convenient and secure new authentication methods. Such new forms
of authentication, which are now more and more widely used, can be
linked to e-IDs, issued by public authorities or private entities
as in the Nordic countries, that may be used by customers with
numerous market participants..."
<br>
<br>
What I do not understand is that why he thinks "Such new forms of
authentication" does not involve a redirect.
<br>
As far as I understand, "private entities as in the Nordic
countries" uses either SAML or OpenID Connect and make use of
"redirect" to perform the user authentication that is linked to
e-IDs, and they are provided by banks. If I am right, then the
above statement is saying:
<br>
<br>
"Shift their attention away from authentication methods that are
redirecting TPP customers to the banks' webpages (or apps) to
authentication methods that are redirecting TPP customers to the
banks' webpages (or apps)."
<br>
<br>
It just does not make sense...
<br>
<br>
I could go on with a generic Youtube video showing how redirecting
can be non-intrusing but I wanted to understand the above
statement better.
<br>
<br>
Best,
<br>
<br>
Nat
<br>
<br>
On 2019-02-22 18:25, Dave Tonge via Openid-specs-fapi wrote:
<br>
<blockquote type="cite">Dear FAPI WG
<br>
<br>
I just received this and think it may be of interest to you:
<br>
<br>
Please find attached a letter and attachment from Commission
Vice
<br>
President Dombrovskis.
<br>
<br>
He has made some discouraging comments about redirection to
webpages
<br>
and apps:
<br>
<br>
“I WOULD LIKE TO ENCOURAGE INDUSTRY PLAYERS TO SHIFT THEIR
ATTENTION
<br>
AWAY FROM AUTHENTICATION METHODS THAT ARE REDIRECTING TPP
CUSTOMERS TO
<br>
THE BANKS' WEBPAGES (OR APPS). THIS CANNOT BE THE BASIS
FOR
<br>
INNOVATIVE AND COMPETITIVE EUROPEAN PAYMENT SERVICES. Instead,
the
<br>
focus should in my view be on the development of convenient and
secure
<br>
new authentication methods. Such new forms of authentication,
which
<br>
are now more and more widely used, can be linked to e-IDs,
issued by
<br>
public authorities or private entities as in the Nordic
countries,
<br>
that may be used by customers with numerous market
participants…”
<br>
<br>
…“I also invite industry players to work together to find
<br>
practical solutions to other problems that payment initiation
service
<br>
and/or account information service providers are facing. One of
them
<br>
is the regular renewal, every 90 days, of consent for the TPPs’
<br>
access to accounts. This consent renewal requires STRONG
CUSTOMER
<br>
AUTHENTICATION, WHICH WOULD BE A MAJOR INCONVENIENCE IF DONE FOR
EACH
<br>
BANK USING CONVENTIONAL AUTHENTICATION METHODS AND POSSIBLY
<br>
REDIRECTION TO THE BANKS’ AUTHENTICATION PAGES.”
<br>
<br>
Dave
<br>
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</blockquote>
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