[Openid-specs-fapi] Fwd: Letter from Vice-President Valdis Dombrovskis: Comments about Redirection

Dave Tonge dave.tonge at momentumft.co.uk
Mon Mar 11 07:18:21 UTC 2019


I agree with Philippe - I think the issue they are worried about is that
TPPs and Banks are in competition. Therefore there is a worry that the bank
has an incentive to add obstacles to the redirect journey as that gives
them a competitive advantage. The legislation prohibits banks from
introducing such obstacles - but it is very difficult to enforce this in
practice.

>From my perspective, it is all an incentives problem. Most of the banks
don't want to be identity providers and open up access to third parties.
They are being forced to do this and therefore have no incentive to provide
a seamless redirect experience. Compare this with Google / Facebook who
have an incentive to get as many people as possible to use them as identity
providers.

Unfortunately what I believe Mr Dombrovskis misses is the fact that the
customer is both a customer of the bank and of the TPP and as the bank is
fully responsible for implementing "Strong Customer Authentication" and for
detecting fraud then the journey that enables the bank to best protect the
end-user must involve a redirect to the bank.

Ultimately I think that competition between the banks will improve
redirect-based customer journeys. If as a customer I found it easy to use
valuable third party services with my accounts at Bank A, but must harder
to use such services with my accounts at Bank B - I have an incentive to
move all my accounts to Bank A. Such push factors depend on:
 - third party services being useful / valuable enough
 - banks not operating in an anti-competitive oligopoly
 - customers being able to easily switch banks

I agree with Torsten that an official letter could be useful.

Dave



On Sat, 9 Mar 2019 at 21:40, Torsten Lodderstedt via Openid-specs-fapi <
openid-specs-fapi at lists.openid.net> wrote:

> I‘m not sure we will come to a reasonable conclusion by trying to
> interpret Mr. Dombrovski‘s statement. What do you think about sending him
> an official letter and pointing out the contradictions? I mean most
> identity systems work using redirects, even those very, very focused on
> user experience.
>
> Am 09.03.2019 um 18:31 schrieb Henrik Biering via Openid-specs-fapi <
> openid-specs-fapi at lists.openid.net>:
>
> Probably Mr Dombrovski has been presented with the Danish "NemID" a
> *previously* bank owned eID where service providers place a login applet
> on their own webpage. The 2. factor (which is partly optional for banks)
> has been paperbased ch/resp. But most recently an app redirect option has
> been available (and popular). But it is implemented in a way that still
> makes NemID extremely susceptible to realtime phishing.
>
> There is no possibility for ordinary users to distinguish real RP's from
> fake - and not even requirements for authorized RP's to used encrypted
> connections.
>
> It was originally planned to notify NemID under eIDAS by simply defining
> NemID to have the desired security level in the "National Standard for the
> Security Level of Identities". But as a result of a public hearing this
> "security by mere aspiration" definition was removed. And there is
> currently no intention from Danish authorities to notify NemID under eIDAS.
> This is planned for a next generation eID labeled "MitID" that will most
> likely be introduced in 2021.
>
> So in short the Danish eID with the new 2. factor app actually uses
> redirection, but implemented in a way that still does not qualify it to be
> notified as an eID under the eIDAS scheme.
>
> FYI:  Here is an article from the leading Danish IT-newssite Version2
> (hoping that it translates reasonably using online translation services):
>
> https://www.version2.dk/artikel/digitaliseringsstyrelsen-efter-udvikler-angreb-ja-nemid-saarbar-phishing-1086131
>
> Best,
> Henrik Biering
> Den 09-03-2019 kl. 15:30 skrev nat via Openid-specs-fapi:
>
> Restarting the thread as I want to make a youtube video on this one and
> want to hear your opinions.
>
> So, Mr Dombrovskis says:
>
> "I would like to encourage industry players to shift their attention away
> from authentication methods that are redirecting TPP customers to the
> banks' webpages (or apps). This cannot be the basis for innovative and
> competitive European payment services. Instead, the focus should in my view
> be on the development of convenient and secure new authentication methods.
> Such new forms of authentication, which are now more and more widely used,
> can be linked to e-IDs, issued by public authorities or private entities as
> in the Nordic countries, that may be used by customers with numerous market
> participants..."
>
> What I do not understand is that why he thinks "Such new forms of
> authentication" does not involve a redirect.
> As far as I understand, "private entities as in the Nordic countries" uses
> either SAML or OpenID Connect and make use of "redirect" to perform the
> user authentication that is linked to e-IDs, and they are provided by
> banks. If I am right, then the above statement is saying:
>
> "Shift their attention away from authentication methods that are
> redirecting TPP customers to the banks' webpages (or apps) to
> authentication methods that are redirecting TPP customers to the banks'
> webpages (or apps)."
>
> It just does not make sense...
>
> I could go on with a generic Youtube video showing how redirecting can be
> non-intrusing but I wanted to understand the above statement better.
>
> Best,
>
> Nat
>
> On 2019-02-22 18:25, Dave Tonge via Openid-specs-fapi wrote:
>
> Dear FAPI WG
>
> I just received this and think it may be of interest to you:
>
> Please find attached a letter and attachment from Commission Vice
> President Dombrovskis.
>
> He has made some discouraging comments about redirection to webpages
> and apps:
>
> “I WOULD LIKE TO ENCOURAGE INDUSTRY PLAYERS TO SHIFT THEIR ATTENTION
> AWAY FROM AUTHENTICATION METHODS THAT ARE REDIRECTING TPP CUSTOMERS TO
> THE BANKS' WEBPAGES (OR APPS). THIS CANNOT BE THE BASIS FOR
> INNOVATIVE AND COMPETITIVE EUROPEAN PAYMENT SERVICES. Instead, the
> focus should in my view be on the development of convenient and secure
> new authentication methods. Such new forms of authentication, which
> are now more and more widely used, can be linked to e-IDs, issued by
> public authorities or private entities as in the Nordic countries,
> that may be used by customers with numerous market participants…”
>
> …“I also invite industry players to work together to find
> practical solutions to other problems that payment initiation service
> and/or account information service providers are facing. One of them
> is the regular renewal, every 90 days, of consent for the TPPs’
> access to accounts. This consent renewal requires STRONG CUSTOMER
> AUTHENTICATION, WHICH WOULD BE A MAJOR INCONVENIENCE IF DONE FOR EACH
> BANK USING CONVENTIONAL AUTHENTICATION METHODS AND POSSIBLY
> REDIRECTION TO THE BANKS’ AUTHENTICATION PAGES.”
>
> Dave
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Dave Tonge
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