[Openid-specs-fapi] Fwd: Letter from Vice-President ValdisDombrovskis: Comments about Redirection
Nat Sakimura
nat at sakimura.org
Sat Mar 9 15:29:51 UTC 2019
Hi Philippe,
I initially thought of it, but then got disturbed with his statement about Nordic countries where they are provided by banks.
Re: redirecting to public entities – I am not that familiar with eIDAS so it would help me if you could tell me if the regulators will be liable if the Bank depends on them and the transaction were fraudulent? By depending on the external authentication and not getting the client land on the page that the bank controls, the bank loses the opportunity to obtain risk signals like device location, cookie and local storage states, etc. Hence, banks will be exposed to higher risk, you know.
Best,
Nat Sakimura
差出人: Philippe Leothaud
送信日時: 2019年3月10日 0:20
宛先: Financial API Working Group List
CC: nat
件名: Re: [Openid-specs-fapi] Fwd: Letter from Vice-President ValdisDombrovskis: Comments about Redirection
HI Nat,
I suspect his problem is not the redirection per se, but a redirection "to the Banks' Web pages or apps"
I guess he would prefer to have redirection to a public OP and not to the banks' ones though it's just me guessing
Thanks,
Philippe
On Sat, Mar 9, 2019 at 3:31 PM nat via Openid-specs-fapi <openid-specs-fapi at lists.openid.net> wrote:
Restarting the thread as I want to make a youtube video on this one and
want to hear your opinions.
So, Mr Dombrovskis says:
"I would like to encourage industry players to shift their attention
away from authentication methods that are redirecting TPP customers to
the banks' webpages (or apps). This cannot be the basis for innovative
and competitive European payment services. Instead, the focus should in
my view be on the development of convenient and secure new
authentication methods. Such new forms of authentication, which are now
more and more widely used, can be linked to e-IDs, issued by public
authorities or private entities as in the Nordic countries, that may be
used by customers with numerous market participants..."
What I do not understand is that why he thinks "Such new forms of
authentication" does not involve a redirect.
As far as I understand, "private entities as in the Nordic countries"
uses either SAML or OpenID Connect and make use of "redirect" to perform
the user authentication that is linked to e-IDs, and they are provided
by banks. If I am right, then the above statement is saying:
"Shift their attention away from authentication methods that are
redirecting TPP customers to the banks' webpages (or apps) to
authentication methods that are redirecting TPP customers to the banks'
webpages (or apps)."
It just does not make sense...
I could go on with a generic Youtube video showing how redirecting can
be non-intrusing but I wanted to understand the above statement better.
Best,
Nat
On 2019-02-22 18:25, Dave Tonge via Openid-specs-fapi wrote:
> Dear FAPI WG
>
> I just received this and think it may be of interest to you:
>
> Please find attached a letter and attachment from Commission Vice
> President Dombrovskis.
>
> He has made some discouraging comments about redirection to webpages
> and apps:
>
> “I WOULD LIKE TO ENCOURAGE INDUSTRY PLAYERS TO SHIFT THEIR ATTENTION
> AWAY FROM AUTHENTICATION METHODS THAT ARE REDIRECTING TPP CUSTOMERS TO
> THE BANKS' WEBPAGES (OR APPS). THIS CANNOT BE THE BASIS FOR
> INNOVATIVE AND COMPETITIVE EUROPEAN PAYMENT SERVICES. Instead, the
> focus should in my view be on the development of convenient and secure
> new authentication methods. Such new forms of authentication, which
> are now more and more widely used, can be linked to e-IDs, issued by
> public authorities or private entities as in the Nordic countries,
> that may be used by customers with numerous market participants…”
>
> …“I also invite industry players to work together to find
> practical solutions to other problems that payment initiation service
> and/or account information service providers are facing. One of them
> is the regular renewal, every 90 days, of consent for the TPPs’
> access to accounts. This consent renewal requires STRONG CUSTOMER
> AUTHENTICATION, WHICH WOULD BE A MAJOR INCONVENIENCE IF DONE FOR EACH
> BANK USING CONVENTIONAL AUTHENTICATION METHODS AND POSSIBLY
> REDIRECTION TO THE BANKS’ AUTHENTICATION PAGES.”
>
> Dave
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> Openid-specs-fapi at lists.openid.net
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