[Openid-specs-ab] Issue #1164: insecure front-channel use of private_key_jwt client authentication (openid/connect)

Brian Campbell bcampbell at pingidentity.com
Tue Apr 21 13:10:07 UTC 2020


How did/does that work when client_assertion/client_assertion_type were
being tacked onto the authz request? Without reevaluating the bigger
approach, it sure seemed like client_assertion was trying to be used like a
signed request and so it seems like an actual signed request object should
just be a more appropriate replacement.

On Tue, Apr 21, 2020 at 12:57 AM Roland Hedberg <roland at catalogix.se> wrote:

>
> If we use signed request objects, do we mandate it for all authorization
> requests or just for the first one.
>

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