[Openid-specs-ab] Issue #1164: insecure front-channel use of private_key_jwt client authentication (openid/connect)

Roland Hedberg roland at catalogix.se
Mon Apr 20 18:14:39 UTC 2020



> On 20 Apr 2020, at 19:09, Brian Campbell via Openid-specs-ab <openid-specs-ab at lists.openid.net> wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Mon, Apr 20, 2020 at 10:27 AM Joseph Heenan via Openid-specs-ab <openid-specs-ab at lists.openid.net <mailto:openid-specs-ab at lists.openid.net>> wrote:
> Hi all,
> 
>> On 20 Apr 2020, at 16:13, Roland Hedberg via Openid-specs-ab <openid-specs-ab at lists.openid.net <mailto:openid-specs-ab at lists.openid.net>> wrote:
>> 
>> To distinguish our variant from the OIDC Core one in the specification we demand that aud is set to be the authorisation endpoint of the OP. We also ask for the iss and sub claims to be the entity ID of the RP. Furthermore we expect jti to be used to prevent reuse.
> 
> I can’t see any of those requirements mentioned when describing the authentication endpoint authentication at https://bitbucket.org/openid/connect/src/default/openid-connect-federation-1_0.xml#lines-2085 <https://bitbucket.org/openid/connect/src/default/openid-connect-federation-1_0.xml#lines-2085> - is that mentioned somewhere else?
> 
> I was going to ask/say the same thing because I couldn't find it either. 

Unfortunately there is a time lag between the latest version of the text which you can always find at https://github.com/rohe/oidcfederation <https://github.com/rohe/oidcfederation> and the version published at OpenID.

> This is the problem we need to solve. If we can’t use a client authentication method like the one private_key_jwt represents
>> 
>> what other alternatives are there ?
> 
> A signed request object, passed by value, would achieve the same goal of showing control of the private key I think?
> 
> A signed request object seems much more appropriate. 

Sounds like a plan. I think I at least was too hung up on the original idea that included a client authentication.

- Roland

Otium cum dignitate - latin proverb

-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.openid.net/pipermail/openid-specs-ab/attachments/20200420/b212e540/attachment.html>


More information about the Openid-specs-ab mailing list