[Openid-specs-ab] Defining a Hardened (Mix-up and Cut-and-Paste Proof) OpenID Connect Profile

Nick Roy nroy at internet2.edu
Tue Apr 12 17:46:10 UTC 2016


Would it be possible to check for the secure behavior in Roland's test suite and either not certify non-mitigating implementations, or offer a risk mitigation add-on cert for those that do the right thing?

Nick

From: Openid-specs-ab <openid-specs-ab-bounces at lists.openid.net<mailto:openid-specs-ab-bounces at lists.openid.net>> on behalf of William Denniss <wdenniss at google.com<mailto:wdenniss at google.com>>
Date: Tuesday, April 12, 2016 at 11:01 AM
To: "openid-specs-ab at lists.openid.net<mailto:openid-specs-ab at lists.openid.net>" <openid-specs-ab at lists.openid.net<mailto:openid-specs-ab at lists.openid.net>>
Subject: [Openid-specs-ab] Defining a Hardened (Mix-up and Cut-and-Paste Proof) OpenID Connect Profile

One item that came out of the discussions on the sidelines of IETF95 with folk from this WG (specifically Nat, Mike, John, Brian and myself) was the need for the Connect community to respond to the recently<http://arxiv.org/abs/1508.04324v2/> documented<http://arxiv.org/abs/1601.01229v2/> security threats.

Connect is actually in a much stronger place for mitigating these attacks (as noted in the papers themselves) than pure OAuth, with the id_token offering a cryptographic binding of the code to the issuer, audience and session identifier (nonce).

However, certain steps need to be followed, for example using 'nonce' with the code flow (which is optional to implement for clients) to protect against cut-and-paste, and using the form-post response type with the hybrid flow to verify that the code was issued by the expected IdP, to ensure the code is exchanged at the correct token endpoint (mitigating mix-up).

We discussed last week creating a profile of Connect that recommends those practices to mitigate these classes of attack as a response to the security researchers' findings. I wanted to share that suggestion with the list, and continue the conversation.

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