[Openid-specs-ab] Securing token requests when discovery service is used

nov matake nov at matake.jp
Mon Nov 2 11:07:08 UTC 2015


It works for me too.

> On Nov 2, 2015, at 19:43, Justin Richer <jricher at mit.edu> wrote:
> 
> That works for me, too (it’s just after the COSE meeting). 
> 
>  — Justin
> 
>> On Nov 2, 2015, at 7:25 PM, Mike Jones <Michael.Jones at microsoft.com <mailto:Michael.Jones at microsoft.com>> wrote:
>> 
>> 5pm tomorrow works for me. Meet at the IETF registration desk?
>> From: Nat Sakimura <mailto:sakimura at gmail.com>
>> Sent: ‎11/‎2/‎2015 6:54 PM
>> To: nov matake <mailto:nov at matake.jp>
>> Cc: openid-specs-ab at lists.openid.net <mailto:openid-specs-ab at lists.openid.net>
>> Subject: Re: [Openid-specs-ab] Securing token requests when discovery service is used
>> 
>> What about 5pm and before the social? 
>> 
>> 2015-11-02 18:40 GMT+09:00 nov matake <nov at matake.jp <mailto:nov at matake.jp>>:
>> Does the f2f happen tomorrow in Yokohama?
>> Then I can join :)
>> 
>> nov
>> 
>> On Nov 2, 2015, at 11:29, Nat Sakimura <sakimura at gmail.com <mailto:sakimura at gmail.com>> wrote:
>> 
>>> perhaps do a f2f adhoc this week? 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 2015年11月2日月曜日、John Bradley<ve7jtb at ve7jtb.com <mailto:ve7jtb at ve7jtb.com>>さんは書きました:
>>> The attack is not on the authentication, it is on intercepting the code and being able to replay it.
>>> 
>>> Using a key the client is given from  registration to authenticate the request to the token endpoint won’t help because that can just be man in the middled by the attacker as well.
>>> 
>>> This is also not specific to dynamic client registration.  It just makes it easier.  I could make the client come to a site to register and give it bad endpoints as well.
>>> 
>>> In Connect if you do a id_token code flow the issuer in the returned token would be wrong for the request so that should actually stop the attack on a client that is validating id_token correctly in that flow.  (allowing late binding per one proposal will make this vulnerable as well I think.
>>> 
>>> In the code only flow it is much harder to stop because the attacker can register itself and then replay any keys it gets from the real AS.
>>> If the client provides a public key in registration that would help if we used signed requests.
>>> 
>>> To stop the attack you really need to send the token endpoint URI in the request to the Authorization server, or use a asymmetric pkce challenge verifier.
>>> 
>>> I haven’t had a chance to organize the options yet.
>>> 
>>> John B.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>>> On Oct 31, 2015, at 5:14 AM, Mike Jones <Michael.Jones at microsoft.com <>> wrote:
>>>> 
>>>> The other thing that can't be faked by an attacker is the OP's keys. If the ID token isn't signed by the right keys, then the RP knows that there's a problem.  This points to a possible solution involving authenticating the jwks_uri value.
>>>> 
>>>> Remember also that the Implicit flows don't use a token endpoint. So solutions that involve authenticating the token endpoint won't work for deployments using only Implicit flows.
>>>> 
>>>> John, Justin, and Nov, when you send in your IIW session notes, can you also please send them here?
>>>> 
>>>> Thanks,
>>>> -- Mike
>>>> From: Preibisch, Sascha H <>
>>>> Sent: ‎10/‎30/‎2015 1:00 PM
>>>> To: openid-specs-ab at lists.openid.net <>
>>>> Subject: [Openid-specs-ab] Securing token requests when discovery service is used
>>>> 
>>>> Hi!
>>>> 
>>>> Now that IIW is over I would like to bring up my thoughts regarding the
>>>> session we had with John regarding the discovery service issue.
>>>> 
>>>> If I am the 'bad' discovery service provider I can fake all values within
>>>> the discovery response. Except for the /token endpoint. That has to point
>>>> to my system in order for me to receive the authorization_code and client
>>>> credentials.
>>>> 
>>>> Therefore I believe there are two solutions:
>>>> 
>>>> * the discovery response to the client has to include a secret which has to be included
>>>> in the initial /authorize request. The authorization server validates the
>>>> value and fails the request if it is invalid. This of course has the
>>>> drawback that the authorization server has to keep state. As a server guy
>>>> I would not like to support this flow
>>>> 
>>>> * The better solution I see, and as I mentioned during the discussion, is
>>>> that the client should include the target /token endpoint as an additional
>>>> request parameter for the initial /authorize request. The authorization
>>>> server does a simple string comparison and fails if the /token endpoint is
>>>> not the one as expected
>>>> 
>>>> Regards,
>>>> Sascha
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> Openid-specs-ab mailing list
>>>> Openid-specs-ab at lists.openid.net <>
>>>> http://lists.openid.net/mailman/listinfo/openid-specs-ab <http://lists.openid.net/mailman/listinfo/openid-specs-ab>
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> -- 
>>> Nat Sakimura (=nat)
>>> Chairman, OpenID Foundation
>>> http://nat.sakimura.org/ <http://nat.sakimura.org/>
>>> @_nat_en
>>> 
>>> _______________________________________________
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>> 
>> 
>> 
>> -- 
>> Nat Sakimura (=nat)
>> Chairman, OpenID Foundation
>> http://nat.sakimura.org/ <http://nat.sakimura.org/>
>> @_nat_en
>> _______________________________________________
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> 

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