[Openid-specs-ab] Issue #979: Discovery / Security Considerations: CSRF attack on user input identifier (openid/connect)

Vladimir Dzhuvinov issues-reply at bitbucket.org
Tue Aug 25 12:27:23 UTC 2015

New issue 979: Discovery / Security Considerations: CSRF attack on user input identifier

Vladimir Dzhuvinov:

I would like to propose a new section under 7. Security Considerations:

7.3 CSRF Attack On User Input Identifier

The RP MUST ensure that input of the Identifier used to commence OpenID Provider Issuer discovery is submitted by the legitimate End-User and protected from Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) attacks. 

An attacker may employ a CSRF attack to submit an Identifier chosen to resolve to an Issuer location and OpenID Provider Metadata document controlled by the attacker. The attacker may then return OpenID Provider Metadata pointing to the Client Registration Endpoint and Authorization Endpoint of a legitimate OP for the End-User while referring to a malicious Token Endpoint in order to steal the authorization grant and client credentials of the RP.

This proposal was prompted by a paper that was published last week: 


The paper has a number of problems, such as failing to clearly identify CSRF as the key issue and recommending measures for that. Anyway, the threat of CSRF is there and I think we should warn developers of this.

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