[Openid-specs-ab] Verifiable presentation question

David Waite david at alkaline-solutions.com
Sat May 15 01:54:20 UTC 2021

> On May 14, 2021, at 7:15 PM, Tom Jones <thomasclinganjones at gmail.com> wrote:
> DW - A verifiable presentation is defined in terms of a mandated cryptographic proof. Externalized biometrics (e.g. photo in the credential) are effectively a separate proof external to VC/VP that the holder is the subject. We could eventually have cryptographic means of verifying this via secure wallets.
> TJ - I certainly hope we can focus strongly on this. AFAIK (DW?) the dpop is only proof of possession and so does not meet proof-of-presence. I plan to push OIDF hard in the direction of active proof-of-possession from certified apps on well-known smartphones. This will become critical when a mobile driver's license can get you access to a nuclear power plant, which is a goal of the current DHS RFC. I think that the next spec from OIDF needs to enable this.
I agree, and do not like divulging biometric data just to have this process be external.

My hope is that mDL requirements (which I’m still coming up to speed on) will push platforms to support binding a particular biometric to the credential. Today, the binding is to a mutable set of authentication methods - I can always temporarily share my PIN or add a fingerprint to the list of allowed authentication methods, and this isn’t necessarily represented to a wallet application via public API.

There may also be lower assurance ways which would not be quite so fragile (in terms of causing credentials to be invalidated due to setting changes or device migrations.)

My hope is that we can isolate the issuer binding a credential with the holder in a similar way to how we isolate the authentication and authorization consent processes at the OP/AS, so that this evolution does not need to happen directly within OIDC specs.


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