[security] [OpenID] OpenID/Debian PRNG/DNS Cache poisoning advisory

[Eddy Nigg (StartCom Ltd.)]

Ben Laurie:
> Security Advisory (08-AUG-2008) (CVE-2008-3280)
> ===============================================
>
> Ben Laurie of Google's Applied Security team, while working with an
> external researcher, Dr. Richard Clayton of the Computer Laboratory,
> Cambridge University, found that various OpenID Providers (OPs) had
> TLS Server Certificates that used weak keys, as a result of the Debian
> Predictable Random Number Generator (CVE-2008-0166).
>
> In combination with the DNS Cache Poisoning issue (CVE-2008-1447) and
> the fact that almost all SSL/TLS implementations do not consult CRLs
> (currently an untracked issue), this means that it is impossible to
> rely on these OPs.
>    

This affects any web site and service provider of various natures. It's 
not exclusive for OpenID nor for any other protocol / standard / 
service! It may affect an OpenID provider if it uses a compromised key 
in combination with unpatched DNS servers. I don't understand why OpenID 
is singled out, since it can potentially affect any web site including 
Google's various services (if Google would have used Debian systems to 
create their private keys).

Regards
Signer: 	Eddy Nigg, StartCom Ltd. <http://www.startcom.org>
Jabber: 	startcom at startcom.org <xmpp:startcom at startcom.org>
Blog: 	Join the Revolution! <http://blog.startcom.org>
Phone: 	+1.213.341.0390


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