<html xmlns:v="urn:schemas-microsoft-com:vml" xmlns:o="urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:office" xmlns:w="urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:word" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/TR/REC-html40">
<head>
<META HTTP-EQUIV="Content-Type" CONTENT="text/html; charset=us-ascii">
<meta name=Generator content="Microsoft Word 11 (filtered medium)">
<!--[if !mso]>
<style>
v\:* {behavior:url(#default#VML);}
o\:* {behavior:url(#default#VML);}
w\:* {behavior:url(#default#VML);}
.shape {behavior:url(#default#VML);}
</style>
<![endif]-->
<style>
<!--
/* Font Definitions */
@font-face
{font-family:Tahoma;
panose-1:2 11 6 4 3 5 4 4 2 4;}
/* Style Definitions */
p.MsoNormal, li.MsoNormal, div.MsoNormal
{margin:0in;
margin-bottom:.0001pt;
font-size:12.0pt;
font-family:"Times New Roman";}
a:link, span.MsoHyperlink
{color:blue;
text-decoration:underline;}
a:visited, span.MsoHyperlinkFollowed
{color:blue;
text-decoration:underline;}
span.EmailStyle18
{mso-style-type:personal-reply;
font-family:Arial;
color:navy;}
@page Section1
{size:8.5in 11.0in;
margin:1.0in 1.25in 1.0in 1.25in;}
div.Section1
{page:Section1;}
-->
</style>
</head>
<body lang=EN-US link=blue vlink=blue>
<div class=Section1>
<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>Phishing (and pharming) is only an issue
for *<b><span style='font-weight:bold'>some</span></b>* ways of authenticating
to an OP. <o:p></o:p></span></font></p>
<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p> </o:p></span></font></p>
<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>The practical issue today is that most OP’s
have no better way of authenticating a user than phishable username/password
login screens. However, OpenID (the protocol) is intended to support (practically)
any form of authentication that an OP chooses to use. It is entirely possible
to use, for example, token-based authentication that isn’t susceptible to
the same phishing attacks. <o:p></o:p></span></font></p>
<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p> </o:p></span></font></p>
<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>My hope was that OpenID as a protocol would
get launched in parallel with innovation in authentication mechanisms –
including (of course) anti-phishing mechanisms for sites using plain old
username/password. <o:p></o:p></span></font></p>
<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p> </o:p></span></font></p>
<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'>I would hate for OpenID to be shot down in
whole because of the special exposure it has to phishing in the simple
deployment scenario which dominates today. I just want to make sure we don’t
forget that enabling authentication innovation is a key driver for OpenID, at
least for some of us.<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>
<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p> </o:p></span></font></p>
<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'> -Gabe<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>
<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p> </o:p></span></font></p>
<p class=MsoNormal><font size=2 color=navy face=Arial><span style='font-size:
10.0pt;font-family:Arial;color:navy'><o:p> </o:p></span></font></p>
<div style='border:none;border-left:solid blue 1.5pt;padding:0in 0in 0in 4.0pt'>
<div>
<div class=MsoNormal align=center style='text-align:center'><font size=3
face="Times New Roman"><span style='font-size:12.0pt'>
<hr size=2 width="100%" align=center tabindex=-1>
</span></font></div>
<p class=MsoNormal><b><font size=2 face=Tahoma><span style='font-size:10.0pt;
font-family:Tahoma;font-weight:bold'>From:</span></font></b><font size=2
face=Tahoma><span style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:Tahoma'>
general-bounces@openid.net [mailto:general-bounces@openid.net] <b><span
style='font-weight:bold'>On Behalf Of </span></b>Bob Wyman<br>
<b><span style='font-weight:bold'>Sent:</span></b> Friday, January 19, 2007
4:06 PM<br>
<b><span style='font-weight:bold'>To:</span></b> Gavin Baumanis<br>
<b><span style='font-weight:bold'>Cc:</span></b> openid-general<br>
<b><span style='font-weight:bold'>Subject:</span></b> Re: [OpenID] OpenID and
phishing (was AnnouncingOpenIDAuthentication 2.0 - Implementor's Draft 11)</span></font><o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
<p class=MsoNormal><font size=3 face="Times New Roman"><span style='font-size:
12.0pt'><o:p> </o:p></span></font></p>
<p class=MsoNormal><font size=3 face="Times New Roman"><span style='font-size:
12.0pt'>On 1/19/07, <b><span style='font-weight:bold'>Gavin Baumanis</span></b>
<<a href="mailto:gavin.baumanis@rmit.edu.au">gavin.baumanis@rmit.edu.au</a>>
wrote:<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>
<div>
<div>
<p class=MsoNormal><font size=3 face="Times New Roman"><span style='font-size:
12.0pt'>> I think not addressing [Phishing] in the spec ... is not a wise
decision... <br>
<br>
I keep gettting the sense that somehow people seem to think that "not
addressing phishing in the spec" is the same as "not addressing
phishing." But, phishing can certainly be addressed in a distinct document
and the two documents can then be linked together. By having two related
documents, we can "address phishing" without addressing it in the
spec. Actually, I think doing it that way would make a great deal of sense --
It's a standard separation of concerns. <br>
<br>
bob wyman<o:p></o:p></span></font></p>
</div>
</div>
<p class=MsoNormal><font size=3 face="Times New Roman"><span style='font-size:
12.0pt'><o:p> </o:p></span></font></p>
</div>
</div>
</body>
</html>